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A large literature examines the interaction of private and public funding of public goods and charities,
much of it testing if public funding crowds out private funding. This paper makes two contributions
to this literature. First, the crowding out effect could also occur in the opposite direction: in response
to the level of private contributions, the government may alter its funding. I model how crowding out
can manifest in both directions. Second, with asymmetric information about the quality of a public
good, one source of funding may act as a signal about that quality and crowd in the other source of
funding. I test for crowding out or crowding in either direction using a large panel data set gathered
from nonprofit organizations' tax returns. I find strong evidence that government grants crowd in private
donations, consistent with the signaling model. Regression point estimates indicate that private donations
crowd out government grants, but they are not statistically significant.
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  Public goods are often provided by both governments and individuals.  Benevolent 
governments may provide public goods to overcome the market's failure; altruistic individuals 
may likewise do so.  The interaction of these two sources of the provision of public goods 
ultimately affects the overall level of funding.  In response to an increase in government 
spending on a public good or charity, altruistic individuals who care about the total level of the 
public good may reduce their contributions.  Because of this "crowding out" effect, a government 
choosing to increase funding to a charity by a given amount may actually increase the charity's 
revenues by only a fraction of that amount.  The same effect can occur in the opposite direction.  
If a government sees that private donations to a charity have risen, then it may reduce its support 
of that charity.  Additionally, government funding may "crowd in" private donations if 
governments use grants as a signal of the quality of a public good.  For both individuals and 
governments who are concerned about public goods, the impact of the potential crowding out 
and crowding in effects must be considered. 
  The literature on crowding out extends back at least to Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984), 
who show theoretically that an exogenous increase in government funding to charities can 
decrease private donations.  In those models, crowding out is exactly one-for-one, since the 
altruistic individuals care only about the total funding to the charity and not the source of 
funding.
1  Empirical evidence, including Kingma (1989), finds that the crowding out effect is 
less than one-for-one.  One explanation, provided by Andreoni (1989), is that individuals are 
"impure altruists" in that they receive a "warm glow" from their own giving, independent of the 
level of the public good.
2  Some studies find crowding in of government grants; Khanna and 
Sandler (2000) find this for charities in the UK, and Payne (2001) finds this for academic 
research institutions.  Rose-Ackerman (1986) describes conditions under which government 
grants can crowd in private donations.  For instance, matching grants are likely to spur an 
increase in donations.  Grants may also come with mandated regulatory changes that make the 
charity more appealing to donors.  If a charity exhibits economies of scale, then increased 
                                                 
1 Early extensions of those theoretical models include Bergstrom et. al. (1986) and Bernheim (1986). 
2 More recently, Parker and Thurman (2008) find that government provision of open space can crowd out purchases 
from private land trusts, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) find that government provision of health insurance through 
Medicaid crowds out private provision of insurance, Dokko (2008) finds that changes in government donations to 
the National Endowment for the Arts after the 1994 Republican electoral victories crowded out private donations to 
arts groups, Gruber and Hungerman (2007) find that New Deal programs during the Great Depression crowded out 
church spending on social services, and Simmons and Emanuele (2004) find that government funding can crowd out 
individuals' donations of both money and time.     3 
government revenue reduces the marginal cost of providing the service, making private 
donations more effective.  Finally, grants may provide information, either explicitly through 
mandated reporting, or implicitly through the signal provided by the grant's acceptance.  In a 
model of revenues of research universities, Payne (2001) shows that if government funding acts 
as a signal of institutional quality, then crowding in effects may dominate crowding out effects.  
A signaling model of contributions to charities is presented in Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni 
(2006).  There, "seed money" from large donors or announcements of previous donations 
increase others' donations by acting as a signal of the charity's quality.  Evidence of this effect is 
found in a field experiment in List and Lucking-Reiley (2002).
3   
  That literature focuses solely on how government spending affects individual giving.  
This paper also examines the opposite direction of causality: do private contributions to charities 
crowd out public funds?  I use a model of the interaction of government and private contributions 
to a public good to show that government grants can crowd out private donations, or private 
donations, if set exogenously, can crowd out government grants.  Adding asymmetric 
information about quality to the model yields the conclusion that one source of funding can act 
as a signal of quality and crowd in the other source of funding.  I then empirically look for 
evidence of either crowding out or crowding in in both directions using data on private and 
public contributions to charities.  
  This paper makes two contributions to the literature on crowding out and crowding in of 
charitable giving.  First, though numerous papers test whether government grants crowd out 
private donations to charities, none can be found that either model or empirically test, using a 
large panel dataset on diverse charities, for crowding out in the opposite direction.
4  In fact, a 
negative correlation between government and private funding of charities could be evidence for 
either type of crowding out.  Here, I test for causality in both directions by using instrumental 
variables to control for the endogeneity of the other side's contribution.  Second, I combine the 
crowding out literature with the literature on the signaling effects of large contributions.  
                                                 
3 Landry et. al. (2006) also find some evidence that seed money increases others' contributions, but they find a 
stronger effect from being entered in a lottery for a cash prize when donating and from the physical attractiveness of 
the person asking for a contribution.  Lange (2006) develops a model where the lottery prize money is provided by 
donors and thus acts similarly to seed money. 
4 Garrett and Rhine (2008) use time series data on total government and private contributions to charities to test for 
Granger causality in both directions.  They find evidence that grants crowd out donations and that donations crowd 
out grants for some types of charities and some types of government funding, though their results are from aggregate 
time series data, not charity-level data.     4 
Government grants can act like seed grants in that they convey information to other donors about 
charity quality.  I use an extensive panel data set with financial data from almost 30,000 charities 
over six years to test the predictions of the models. 
  In a simple extension to the standard theoretical model with perfect information, I find 
that an exogenous increase in government funding to a public good causes a decrease in 
individuals' contributions, while an exogenous increase in individuals' contributions causes a 
decrease in government funding.  This decrease in funding can be one-for-one under certain 
conditions.  When both public and private funding are endogenous, the level of public good 
provision depends on the order in which the players move.  When individuals are uncertain about 
the quality of the public good but governments are not, government grants can act as a signal to 
individuals of the quality.  In this case, I show that the crowding out effect of increased funding 
can be countered by a crowding in effect from the signal.  On net, either crowding out or 
crowding in of private donations is possible.  Empirically, I look for evidence of crowding out or 
crowding in in both directions.  I find strong evidence that government grants crowd in private 
donations and weak evidence that private donations crowd out government grants.  The evidence 
that government grants crowd in private donations is robust to various specifications of the data 
sample.   
  The presence of crowding in of contributions to charities is of concern to both 
governments and individuals who make these contributions.  A government might choose an 
optimal level of provision of a charity or public good and adjust its funding to reach that level.  
Without accounting for the crowding in response by private donors, funding may exceed the 
optimal level.  Likewise, if the level of private donations affects government support, then an 
individual's optimal level of giving ought to account for the reaction of government grants.  
Many worry that recent large increases in private funding for global public health initiatives, 
including large grants from the Gates Foundation, are causing local governments to reduce health 
spending, evidence of crowding out of government grants.
5 
  The next two sections present the theoretical models that provide the foundation for the 
empirical analysis.  Section 1 shows how crowding out of government grants or of private 
donations is possible.  In section 2, I add uncertainty about the quality of the public good to the 
                                                 
5 See Cohen (2006) and Smith and MacKellar (2007).   5 
model, and present a signaling model that can lead to crowding in.  Section 3 describes the data, 
section 4 the estimation strategy, and section 5 presents the results.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
I. Crowding out of Private and Government Contributions 
  The model presented here is a simple static equilibrium model of the amount of private 
and public giving to a charity or public good.  Consider an economy with  N  individuals indexed 
by  i.  Each individual has an exogenous income allocation  yi,  is subject to a lump sum tax  τi,
6  
and chooses a voluntary contribution  gi  to the public good.  The individual gets utility from 
consumption,  ci,  and from the level of the public good,  G.
7  The utility function is thus  Ui = 
U(ci, G).  Suppose that  Ux > 0,  Uxx < 0  for x = c, G,  and  UcG > 0  , where  Ux  represents the 
derivative of the utility function with respect to the variable  x.  Also suppose that  Ux → ∞ as x 







 ,  so that 
private and public contributions to the public good are perfect substitutes in production.
8  The 
individual's budget constraint is  yi ≤ ci + gi + τi,  and this constraint must bind.  The individual 
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) , (  .  The coefficients  γi  represent the weight on each individual's utility in the 
social welfare function.
9  The government chooses the tax structure  {τi}  to maximize social 
welfare.   
  As previous literature on crowding out has considered government action (the tax 
schedule  τi)  exogenous, I start by considering that case in the following section.  Later, I 
                                                 
6 The exogenous income and lump sum tax mean that issues of the distortionary effects of taxation are not addressed 
by this model.  Saez (2004) considers optimal tax policy in the presence of crowd out and tax distortions.  The 
model here could be amended to include proportional taxes rather than lump sum, or it could include a parameter to 
represent a marginal cost of public funds that captures tax distortions.  
7 The public good  G  may also incorporate private goods provided by a charity to individuals (e.g. food, clothing) as 
long as donors are altruistic.  In other words, the fact that donors feel altruistic towards recipients of charitable 
services means that the private consumption of those services becomes a public good. 
8 In Ferris and West (2003), the cost of providing the public good differs for public and private contributions.  They 
use this cost-side explanation rather than Andreoni's (1989) utility-based explanation for the partial crowding out of 
public contributions that is found empirically. 
9 For recent uses of utilitarian, or Benthamite, social welfare functions, see e.g. Armenter (2007) or Eichner and 
Pethig (2006).   6 
consider how government responds to an exogenous change in the level of private donations, and 
in the Appendix how the two types of agents interact when both move endogenously. 
 
Exogenous government action 
  First, suppose that the government sets its taxes exogenously and consider the response of 
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  .  Individual  i  takes as 
given all other private contributions  gj.  The first order condition for this maximization problem, 
assuming an interior solution, is  Uc = UG.  The left hand side of the first order condition is the 
marginal cost of an additional unit of private contribution, which is the foregone consumption 
from that unit of wealth,  Uc.  This is equated with the marginal benefit of an additional unit of 
private contribution, equal to the additional amount from the public good that is created from the 
individual's contribution,  UG.  At a corner solution, where the individual optimizes by giving 
nothing to the public good,  Uc > UG,  since the cost of giving the first dollar outweighs the 
benefit. 
  Crowding out is analyzed by evaluating  dgi/dτi,  or the change in private contribution 
resulting from a change in the forced level of government contribution from individual  i.  (This 
is a comparative static result for an agent's best-response function, not for a Nash equilibrium 
contribution.)  This derivative is evaluated using the implicit function theorem on the first order 


















Private contributions are perfectly crowded out by the government's contribution.
10  This result is 
intuitive; individuals only care about the level of the public good and not about the source of its 
funding, so they are indifferent whether it is funded through their voluntary contributions or 
through their taxes.
11  Since  gi  and τi  appear together always summed in the individual's utility 
                                                 
10 This result is comparable Proposition 3 in Andreoni (1990).  It can also be seen by incorporating taxes into the 
model of Cornes and Hartley (2007), which explicitly models individuals' decisions as a function of the total amount 
of the public good  G.  
11 The Appendix shows that allowing a warm glow effect makes this derivative more complicated and not 
necessarily equal to –1.  Bergstrom et. al. (1986) show how considering corner solutions can make the crowding out 
less than one-for-one: those individuals who contribute nothing cannot respond to a tax increase by contributing 
even less.   7 
function, each individual can be seen as just maximizing this sum, so that any exogenous change 
in  τi  is offset perfectly by changing the choice of  gi.   
   
Exogenous Individual Action 
  The previous section assumes that the taxes are set exogenously and considers the 
response of individuals to a change in those taxes.  This structure of the problem is most 
commonly seen in the empirical literature on crowding out.  However, one may just as easily 
consider the government's response to a change in private donations to public goods.  A large 
increase in private donations to a charity, due to perhaps a fundraising drive or a high-profile 
event highlighting the charity's need, may cause the government to reduce its giving to that 
charity compared to what it otherwise would have given under the same conditions but without 
the increased private contributions. 
  To capture this other direction of crowding out, suppose that the actions of each 
individual are treated as exogenous by the government, who then sets the taxes {τi}  to maximize 
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where private giving  gi  is exogenous.  Assume an interior solution for all  τi.  This yields N  first 
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0     for  i = 1,…,N.  The social marginal cost of increasing 
the tax on individual  i  is the foregone value of consumption for that person.  This equals the 
marginal benefit of increasing the tax, which is the value of the increase in the public good.  This 
benefit accrues to each person's utility function, and hence it is summed over each individual.  
To evaluate  dτi/dgi  using the implicit function theorem, one must calculate the inverse of an  N 
× N  matrix (from the  N  first order conditions).  Instead, one can look at the government's social 
welfare function and note that  gi  and  τi  are perfect substitutes, appearing only as a sum, as they 
are in individual  i's  utility function in the section above.  Thus the government can act as if 
maximizing their sum, and so any change in a  gi  will be offset perfectly by a change in  τi.   
  Formally, suppose at equilibrium the government chooses  τ1*, τ2*,…, τN*  in response to 
donations of  g1*, g2*, …, gN* (all interior solutions).  The value of social welfare is thus    8 
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   .  Consider an exogenous change in just one 
individual's donation level from  gk*  to  gk**.  By replacing  τk** = τk* - (gk** - gk*),  and 
keeping all other tax levels the same, the government can achieve the same level of welfare  W*.  
Can the government do any better in this case?  Suppose it can, so that some   N    ˆ ,..., ˆ , ˆ 2 1   exist 
such that   
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If this inequality holds, then, given each  gi = gi*  (the initial equilibrium), the government can 
set all  τi =  i ˆ   except for  τk =  *) * * ( ˆ k k k g g      and get the same level of welfare as in the 
left-hand side of the above inequality.  But then  W*  is not the maximum level of welfare 
achievable given the initial equilibrium.  This contradicts the initial assumption.  Thus, the 
government cannot do any better in response to a change from  gk*  to  gk**  than replacing  τk** 
= τk* - (gk** - gk*),  and keeping all other tax levels the same.  By replacing these changes with 
infinitesimal changes, it follows that  dτi/dgi = -1  and  dτi/dgj = 0  for  i ≠ j.  The government 
thus perfectly crowds out any change in private donations through individually based taxes.   
 
  The previous two sections have each considered a case where one side of the market acts 
exogenously; in the first section I followed the literature by assuming the government sets the tax 
rates exogenously, and in the following section I assumed that private donations were set 
exogenously.  The next logical extension is assuming both private donations and government 
grants are endogenous.
12  In the Appendix, I introduce this extension and briefly describe the 
multiple equilibria that can arise from the fact that the players can move in different orders.
13  I 
acknowledge that, without imposing functional forms or assuming homogeneity, not many 
results beyond first order conditions are attainable. 
                                                 
12 This is similar to the contribution made by Knight (2002) to the federalism literature.  He departs from the 
assumption of exogenous federal grants to states by supposing that they are determined in a political process, so that 
federal spending may help determine state spending, and vice versa.  However, he does not study charitable giving.  
13 In fact, the first order conditions in each of the previous two subsections, assuming either government or private 
behavior exogenous, are best response functions from the Nash equilibrium.   9 
  Additionally, the model makes two assumptions to yield perfect crowding out in both 
directions: lack of "impure altruism" or a warm-glow effect, and a benevolent government.  
Removing either of these two assumptions may result in crowding out being less than one-for-
one.  The assumption ignoring impure altruism is contrary to much empirical evidence 
suggesting that individuals do in fact experience a "warm glow" when giving; neurological 
evidence for a warm glow effect is documented in Harbaugh et. al. (2007).  A benevolent 
government is perhaps an equally dubious assumption.  The Appendix thus also extends the 
model to include warm glow and non-benevolent governments.  Those extensions are relegated 
to the Appendix because they do not affect the qualitative nature of the results shown above (and 
in the following section).  The key result, that of private donations crowding out government 
grants, can hold also without these two assumptions, although with a different magnitude.   
A final extension that is also presented in the Appendix includes the behavior of charities 
in response to government grants or private donations.  A growing literature examines charities' 
response, especially in their choices over fundraising expenditures (Andreoni and Payne 2003, 
2009, Breman 2006).  Empirically, I control for a charity's fundraising expenditures and allow 
that variable to be endogenously determined.  In the Appendix, I provide an outline for extending 
the theory to allow for charitable fundraising expenditures. 
 
II. Quality Signaling  
  In the model in the prior section, the government and all individuals have perfect 
information.  It is likely, however, that some uncertainty exists about the quality of a public good 
and how it affects individuals' utility functions.  Furthermore, asymmetries between the 
government and individuals may exist concerning this uncertainty.  Governments may have 
access to more information about a charity or public good and consequently be more informed 
about its quality.  Alternatively, some private donors, like large private foundations, may have 
more information about charity quality.  I capture this information asymmetry in the model here 
and show that when the government has full information, it can use its tax policy to signal 
charity quality to individuals.  This signaling can lead to a crowding in effect that works against 
the crowding out effect found earlier, if a higher tax rate signals a higher quality charity towards 
which individuals want to give more in donations.  This model thus combines the crowding out   10 
literature with the literature on quality signaling of seed grants: government grants can provide 
the same quality signal as private seed grants.
14   
  In the model that follows, I assume that it is the government that has the full information 
about charity quality and thus can use its tax policy to signal that quality.  The prediction that 
government grants can crowd in private donations is based on this assumption about information 
asymmetry.  What if the information asymmetry goes in the opposite direction; what if 
individuals observe the quality of the public good but the government does not?  Clearly, the 
implication must be that crowding in can occur in the opposite direction.  Although the model is 
not perfectly symmetric between individuals and the government, this result is attainable 
nonetheless, as long as the individuals are first movers (if the party that receives the private 
information does not move first, it cannot signal that information).  Thus, a slightly extended 
model predicts that private donations may crowd in government grants, and the empirical work 
identifying the response of government grants to private donations is testing this prediction as 
well.  I omit this extension, but it is straightforward.  A justification for the assumption that 
governments have the private information is that governments tend to make large grants to 
organizations and so are likely to spend more time researching the effectiveness of the charity 
than individuals, who make smaller donations on average.  This is true both absolutely and as a 
fraction of total government versus private expenditure. 
  To incorporate information asymmetries, suppose that the public good  G  can vary in 
quality, measured by the variable  ʱ.  Following Andreoni (2006), let the individual's utility 
function be defined as  U(ci,G; ʱ) = u(ci) + v(G;ʱ)  where, as before, utility is increasing in both 
consumption,  c,  and the level of the public good,  G.  Also suppose that  dv/dʱ > 0  and  
d
2v/dGdʱ > 0;  that is, both total utility and the marginal utility of the public good increase with  
ʱ.  The separability of the private and public good in utility ensures that, under full information 
(if the individual knows the level of  ʱ),  an increase in  ʱ  induces individuals to donate more to 
the public good.   
  Suppose that individuals do not know the value of  ʱ, but the government does.  The 
government does not convey this information directly to individuals, but it sets taxes based on 
                                                 
14 The model is thus quite similar to the models in Payne (2001), Vesterlund (2003), and Andreoni (2006).  Of those, 
only Payne (2001) explicitly considers the government acting as the "seed" grant maker or the signaler of quality.  
However, that model avoids dealing with Bayesian equilibria by supposing a reduced-form function for the signal, 
where the level of government grants directly affects individuals' beliefs about the quality.     11 
the value it observes.  In the standard signaling model, the holder of private information is unable 
to directly convey that information, usually because such an announcement cannot be credible, 
and thus a signal is required.  Why can the government in this case not merely announce the  ʱ  it 
observes?  First, this is not in fact observed; governments do not announce the quality of various 
charities.  Second, the government will want to impose a tax and make contributions to the 
public good to overcome the free rider problem.  Since the tax will end up acting as a signal, the 
value added of a direct announcement is zero, and none is made.  Therefore, the government 
does not announce  ʱ  because it does not need to after setting the tax rate. 
For simplicity, assume that the government sets a single tax rate  τ  for all individuals.
15  
Individuals choose their level of private donations,  gi,  simultaneously in response to the 
government's tax level.  Let the government be the first mover.  The game can thus be 
characterized by the following steps: 
1.  Nature chooses a value of the quality of the public good,  ʱ. 
2.  Government observes  ʱ  and sets a tax τ. 
3.  Individuals simultaneously choose their level of private donations to the charity,  gi,  
observing  τ  but not  ʱ. 
This game lends itself to being analyzed in the framework of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
(PBE), in a manner similar to that of the signaling model of Spence (1973).  A PBE is defined by 
a set of strategies of the individuals  gi(τ)  and of the government  τ(ʱ),  and a belief function of 
the individuals  μ(α; τ)  that gives the individuals' common probability density function for  ʱ  
given  τ,  such that the government's strategy is optimal given the individuals' strategies, the 
belief function is derived from the government's strategy using Bayes's rule when possible, and 
individuals' strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game in which the 
probability of  ʱ is given by  μ(ʱ; τ).  
  The model can be solved backwards, starting with the individuals' responses to 
government policy.  Individual  i  chooses a non-negative contribution level  gi  to maximize his 
utility, given  τ  and all other contributions  g-i,  such that  yi ≤ ci + gi + τ  and  G = gi + g-i + Nτ.  
Define  μ(ʱ; τ)  as the individual's density function of beliefs about the value of  ʱ  upon 
observing the signal  τ.  The individual's problem is 
                                                 
15 By making the tax rate identical, this ensures that the signal is a scalar.  Otherwise, the government has an N 
dimensional vector with which to signal the quality of the good.  This assumption simplifies the analysis of the 
separating equilibrium, where each value of  ʱ  is associated with a unique value of  τ.   12 
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where  A  is the support of  ʱ.  The first order condition, assuming an interior solution, is 
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The key results of the model are found in this condition.  Suppose there is a strictly separating 
equilibrium, so that for any value of  ʱ  observed, the government sets a unique tax  τ(ʱ).  Then 
this function must be invertible to  ʱ(τ).  Since individuals' beliefs must be derived from Bayes' 
rule, it follows that  μ(ʱ;τ) = 1(ʱ = ʱ(τ)),  where  1(·) is the indicator function equal to 1 if the 
argument is true and 0 otherwise.  In a PBE with a separating equilibrium, individuals are certain 
about the true value of  ʱ  after observing the signal.  The integral then falls out of the first order 
condition, which becomes 
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This condition can be used to find the effect of the tax on private donations via the implicit 
function theorem: 
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The denominator is strictly positive.  The numerator can be divided into two parts.  The first two 
terms are strictly negative, and they represent the crowding out effect found in the last section.
16  
With no uncertainty about the quality of the public good,  ʱ'(τ) = 0 and the final term in the 
numerator vanishes.  With uncertainty, this last term, the signaling effect, can either intensify or 
oppose the crowding out effect.  The first part of it,  vGʱ,  is positive by assumption.  Suppose 
that the second part,  ʱ'(τ),  is also positive, that is, a higher tax is used to signal a higher quality 
charity.  Then the signaling effect is positive: a higher tax rate increases the level of private 
donations.  The two effects oppose each other.  When the tax increases, individuals want give to 
less because more of the public good is provided for by the government, and they want to give 
more because the tax increase signals that the public good is high quality.
17   
  The two effects oppose each other only when  ʱ'(τ) > 0.  Otherwise, they go in the same 
direction.  If a higher tax signals a lower quality public good, then individuals want to donate 
                                                 
16 The first two terms divided by the denominator do not equal -1, as in the prior section, since here the model has 
been simplified by assuming the government sets an identical tax on each individual.   
17 Compare this equation to Equation 3 in Payne (2001).   13 
less to that good because of both the crowding out effect and the signaling effect.  To find  ʱ(τ),  
the government's problem must be solved.  Upon observing  ʱ,  the government maximizes 
social welfare, taking into account the individuals' responses to the tax it sets.  It thus solves 
 
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multiplier for the constraint from individual i's optimization problem.   
  This first order condition implicitly defines  τ(ʱ),  though it is difficult to interpret 
without further assumptions.  Two assumptions can separately be used to show that  dτ/dʱ > 0.  
One is assuming that the third derivatives of both u and v are zero. Under that assumption,  ʱ'(τ) 
> 0,  and the signaling effect opposes the crowding out effect.
18  A more intuitive assumption is 
the following.  Assume that  v(G; 0) = 0,  so that when  ʱ = 0  the public good provides no 
utility.  Then,  ʱ'(τ) > 0.
19  However, even under either assumption the magnitudes of the two 
effects are unknown, as they depend on the utility function and parameters.  It is possible that the 
signaling effect opposes and dominates the crowding out effect.  In this case, government grants 
crowd in private donations.  The conditions for that to hold are complex when the utility function 
is left this general, so this section merely demonstrates that crowding in is possible when 
government grants act as signals of charity quality.
20 
  The above results hold under the assumption of interior solutions, for both the 
government's and the individuals' choices.  At corner solutions, no interesting results are 
                                                 
18 This can be seen from using the implicit function theorem on the first order condition of the government's 
problem.  Dropping all of the third derivatives from the result yields a strictly negative derivative. 
19 When v(G;0) = 0,  the individuals' response will always be to contribute nothing, and the government's response 
will be to set the tax at zero.  Since, in a separating equilibrium, the tax must be different for different each value of  
ʱ,  as ʱ increases from zero so must  τ(ʱ). 
20 When the utility function is specified as in Vesterlund (2003) and when there are only two values that the quality 
variable  ʱ  can take, the conditions under which crowding in occurs can be found analytically.  Intuitively, it is 
when the difference in charity quality is sufficiently greater than the difference in the tax signals.  When imposing 
the same utility form but allowing a continuous level of charity quality  ʱ,  it is not possible to find these conditions, 
since the signal function  ʱ(τ)  cannot be found.   14 
possible, since individuals are contributing nothing, and marginal changes in the level of the tax 
have no effect on private contributions.  More realistic is the case where the tax is set so that 
some individuals are at a corner solution contributing nothing and others are at the interior with 
positive contributions.  In that case, the above results hold for the subset of individuals at interior 
solutions, while those contributing nothing have a zero crowding out effect and signaling effect.  
Thus in the aggregate, the above results hold, though the magnitude of the crowding out or 
crowding in is reduced insofar as some individuals are not donors.  This follows from the 
analysis of Bergstrom et. al. (1986).     
  Charities typically advertise the grants they receive from both governments and private 
grant makers on their websites, in newsletters, and in press releases.  If government grants 
crowded out private giving, it is unlikely that charities would make public the receipt of such 
grants.  On the other hand, grants signaling quality and crowding in donations are more 
consistent with this observed behavior.  In the empirical work below, I find robust evidence of 
government grants crowding in private donations, suggesting that the signaling effect dominates 
the crowding out effect. 
 
III. Data 
  The data on nonprofit organizations come from IRS tax returns filed by eligible 
organizations.  These data are collected and distributed by the National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS) at the Urban Institute.
21  They are based on the Forms 990 or 990EZ that must 
be filed by all 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations except for religious organizations and any 
organization with less than $25,000 in gross receipts.
22  These data from 1998-2003 are 
contained in the Guidestar-NCCS National Nonprofit Research Database, which contains 
1,388,480 observations from all public charities that filed within those fiscal years.  The data set 
does not include 501(c)(3) private foundations, which receive most of their money from 
investments and endowments and use it primarily to make grants to organizations rather than 
directly for charitable services; private foundations file IRS Form 990-PF. 
                                                 
 
21 http://nccs.urban.org.  
22 Religious organizations receive over half of all charitable giving in the United States (Ronsvalle and Ronsvalle, 
2001).  Religious organizations that receive the majority of their revenue from serving the general public are 
required to file Forms 990.  These include the Sisters of Mercy hospital chain and Lutheran Social Services.  About 
15,000 such religious organizations were required to file in 2001.  Examining donations to Presbyterian Church 
congregations, Hungerman (2005) finds that government provision of charitable services crowd out church 
donations by 20-38 cents on the dollar.     15 
  Organizations are classified according to the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities 
(NTEE), a system developed by the NCCS.  The NTEE divides charities into 645 centile level 
codes, collapsible into 26 major groups and 10 major categories.  In order to make my results 
more comparable with prior research, I limit my scope to a particular set of charities.  Most 
research in crowding out or crowding in of charitable donations has examined social service 
charities, and so I select organizations from the following NTEE categories: crime, employment, 
food and nutrition, housing, human services and community improvement.
23    
  The large data set, containing entries from all 501(c)(3) nonprofit charities that filed with 
the IRS between 1998 and 2003, is useful for analysis but also presents problems with messy 
data.  Froelich et. al. (2000) discuss the adequacy and reliability of the data from IRS Form 990.  
While it is believed that the IRS reporting requirements are not treated with much importance by 
charities, Froelich et. al. (2000) find that the reported data are fairly consistent with more 
detailed audit information, especially in the basic categories of contributions, programming, and 
fundraising.  Still, I undertake measures to clean the data.  The data set contains 339,716 
observations on 76,725 charities.  I drop observations for which there is clear evidence of 
reporting error.  Some charities report revenues by category (e.g. private donations, government 
grants) that do not add up to the reported level of total revenues.  Likewise, for some charities the 
expenditures do not add up correctly.  I purge all of these observations from the data set, leaving 
321,094 observations (95%) and 75,226 charities (98%).  Though the data are a panel, it is a very 
unbalanced one.  To compensate, I include in the base case regressions only those charities that 
appear for all six years, leaving 175,242 observations (55% of the previous total) and 29,207 
charities (39%).  Below, I consider how limiting the data set to a balanced panel affects both the 
summary statistics and the regression results.  Finally, I eliminate charities that ever report a 
negative value for private donations, government grants, or program service revenue, eliminating 
an additional 69 charities (only 0.2%).  Regressions are performed on this cleaned data sample as 
well as on a number of subsamples that eliminate certain types of charities or observations, as 
described below.  In general, the results that I obtain in the base case are robust to these different 
sample specifications.  This is especially important to note for this application, since previous 
                                                 
23 These are the organizations listed under the 1-digit NTEE codes of I, J, K, L, P and S.  This is the same set of 
codes used by Andreoni and Payne (2003) for their set of social service organizations.  Andreoni and Payne (2003) 
also exclude some organizations that they describe as not directly providing services, while I include all 501(c)(3) 
organizations in those categories (see their fn 15).     16 
authors have found that when working with data from Form 990s the choice of sample matters 
greatly for the results. 
  Previous authors have found discrepancies or errors in similar data sets, especially in the 
identifier variables for the charity's type (NTEE code) and state.  Among the charities in the 
balanced panel, none change their NTEE code over the six year period.  Some charities (1,206, 
or 4.1%) do change states.  This could be due to data error, which is problematic since many of 
my control variables and instruments are at the state-year level.  Or, it could result in the charity 
actually relocating, in which case I want to take advantage of that variation.  I identify the 
charities that are erroneously coded as changing states in the following way.  Of the charities that 
are reported to change states, 830 of them (68.8%) have the same state listed for five out of the 
six years, and the year in which the state is listed differently is not the first or last year of the 
sample.  As it is unlikely that a charity would relocate one year and then relocate back the 
following year, I interpret these observations as errors and replace the state variable with the 
state from the charity's other five observations.  The remaining 376 charities either moved in the 
first or last years of the sample period or had more than one year in a different location, and I do 
not change the state variables for them.  An inspection of the scans of the original 990 forms for 
several of these charities supports this distinction between those that actually moved and those 
that were inaccurately reported.
24  
  The charities' revenue sources can be seen in Figure 1, which divides up the average 
source of funding into several categories.
25  The charities receive 14% of their revenue from 
direct public support, including individual donations.  A larger fraction comes from government 
                                                 
24 Simply dropping all charities that report moving states from the regression analysis results in coefficients of 
approximately the same value as in the base case. 
25 The first category is direct public support, which is the main category of donations from individuals.  Second is 
indirect public support, comprised mainly of donations given to the charities collected by federated fundraising 
agencies, such as the United Way.  The next category is government grants, which includes monies from federal, 
state, and local governments.  Program service revenue is the money collected from the services that form the 
organizations' exemption from tax.  For example, a hospital would count as program service revenue all of its 
charges from medical services.  Dues collected includes only the amount of dues received that are not contributions, 
for example the dues that go towards a subscription to a newsletter or some other benefit.  Investment income 
includes dividends and interest on savings and cash accounts; rents and sales include net revenue from rents and 
from sales of securities, inventory, or other assets.  Finally, the last category includes all other revenue, including 
from special events such as dinners, raffles, or door-to-door sales of merchandise.  Revenues are disaggregated into 
these categories only for charities that file Form 990, not Form 990-EZ.  87% of charities do so.  Nonprofits with 
income less than $100,000 and total assets less than $250,000 may file Form 990-EZ instead of Form 990 if they 
prefer.   17 
grants (26%).  About half of their revenue comes from program services.
26  The remaining 
sources of revenues, including investment income, are small.  Table 1 presents revenues 
aggregated into four main categories and compares summary statistics from the full, uncleaned 
data set to those from the smaller sample used in the analysis.  As a measure of private 
donations, I combine direct public support and indirect public support.  Government grants and 
program service revenue have their own categories, and the remaining revenues are classified as 
"other."  I also present statistics on charities' reported fundraising expenditures.  Table 1 shows 
that the mean values are all much higher than the median values, and even the 75
th percentile 
values, suggesting a data set that is skewed towards high-revenue firms.  The differences 
between corresponding statistics in the full data set and the cleaned sample are small; the mean 
values of all variables are smaller and the median and 75
th percentiles are larger in the limited 
data compared to the full set.  The limited data are slightly less skewed than the full data, and 
hence performing econometric analyses on this limited sample may overemphasize the effect 
from larger charities.  This is investigated in the regression results below.  Trends in these values 
from the cleaned data are presented in Figure 2.  The values presented are the average per charity 
value of government grants and private donations in constant 2002 dollars.  The presence of 
crowding out in either direction implies that spikes in government grants would be accompanied 
by dips in private donations, and vice versa.  No such pattern emerges, since both values appear 




  Two different empirical questions are investigated.  First, do government grants crowd 
out or crowd in private donations to charities?  Second, do private donations crowd out or crowd 
in government grants?  While numerous papers have tested for causality in the first direction, no 
paper has examined causality in the opposite direction using panel data on a large number of 
charities.  Because of these two questions, I run two separate regressions, one in which the level 
of private donations to a charity is the dependent variable and the level of government grants is 
an independent variable, and one with those two variables reversed.  It should be noted that in 
                                                 
26 Segal and Weisbrod (1998) test for crowding out between all donations, including private and government grants, 
and program service revenue.     18 
these initial regressions I am merely identifying whether crowding out or crowding in occurs in 
either direction, and I am not attempting to identify the signaling effect modeled in Section 2.  
The presence of crowding in is consistent with signaling but not sufficient to identify signaling 
as its source.  Following these initial regressions, which find crowding in of government grants, I 
will test whether this is explained by signaling.  I show that crowding in is stronger among those 
charities for which less information is known by donors, i.e. newer charities. 
The level of private donations is defined as in Table 1 above: the sum of direct and 
indirect public support.  I also add control variables to the regressions.  At the charity level, these 
are the level of program service revenues and all other revenues.  Furthermore, I gather a number 
of state-year or county-year level variables to control for economic, demographic, and political 
conditions.  These are matched to the charity by the state or county where the charity is located.  
From the Bureau of Labor Statistics I obtain the county-year level unemployment rate, and from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis the county-year level income-per-capita and total population.  
At the state-year level I include the fraction of the population 65 or older, the fraction of a state's 
US Congress and Senate delegations that are Democrats, and a dummy for whether the state 
governor is a Democrat.  Political and economic variables may have important effects on the 
levels of both private and public contributions to charities.  A state with a higher proportion of 
Democrats in power is likely to be composed of more liberal citizens who may be more willing 
to provide financial support for charities.  Likewise, Democratic congresses may be more willing 
to approve higher levels of funding for these groups.  If so, leaving out political proxies causes 
an upward bias on the coefficient of interest.  Finally, because I have six years of data from 
thousands of organizations, I am able to control for organization-specific unobservable effects 
using panel data econometric methods.  The Hausman specification test rejects the assumption 
that the unobservable effect is uncorrelated with the other regressors, so a fixed-effects model is 
employed rather than a random-effects model. 
  Estimates are likely to suffer from endogeneity bias.  The amount of private donations 
and government grants are jointly determined.  Unobservable effects may lead to an increase in 
both of these simultaneously, biasing the coefficient estimates upwards.  For example, an 
exogenous event may increase the need (or perceived need) for a particular charity, which would 
increase that charity's private donations and government grants.  Alternatively, endogeneity 
could bias the estimates downwards.  A restructuring of the charity could cause it to reallocate its   19 
funding between donations and grants, which would create a negative correlation between these 
two values not due to crowding out.  (Regressions in both directions without using instrumental 
variables are presented in Appendix Tables A1 and A2.) 
  Instrumental variables regression is used to correct the endogeneity bias.  This requires 
two separate sets of instruments: one to instrument for the level of government grants in the 
determination of private donations and one for the level of private donations in the determination 
of government grants.  As instruments for the level of government grants, I use state-level 
measures of government transfers to individuals from Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
programs.
27  This represents the overall level of transfers and government giving in a state a 
particular year.  Some states may be more "generous" in their giving, and these instruments 
should pick that up.
28   The generosity of government is determined in a political process, and 
thus it may be directly correlated with private donations and fail the exogeneity requirement: 
more generous donors elect more generous governments.  This is controlled for by the inclusion 
of the political and economic variables described above.  Whatever variance there is in a state's 
level of transfers to SSI that is not accounted for by political or economic variables ought to 
capture something about the government itself rather than about the underlying electorate, and 
thus these instruments ought to satisfy the exogeneity assumption. 
As an instrument for private donations I exploit the fact that funding from individuals can 
come from two sources, listed separately on the Form 990: direct public support (donations) and 
dues.  Though membership dues may seem like just another name for private contributions, the 
instructions for completion of the Form 990 specifically state that only payments that are not 
contributions should be listed under dues.  For example, when dues received exceed the value of 
available membership benefits (e.g. subscriptions to publications or newsletters, reduced-rate 
admissions to events), the difference is to be listed under contributions, not dues.  Dues are thus 
what members pay for the private goods consisting of membership benefits, not the public good 
that is the charity's primary purpose.  The amount of dues that a charity receives is likely to be 
correlated with the amount of private donations received, since charities with higher membership 
bases may get more of both types of revenues.  However, given that charities provide public 
                                                 
27 Khanna and Sandler (2000), Andreoni and Payne (2003), and Payne (1998) use similar instruments.  Data are 
available from the U.S. Social Security Administration website. 
28 Though the basic level of SSI benefits is set at the federal level, many states choose to supplement that value.  I 
also used the level of OASDI benefits as instruments, but adding those had no effect on the results.   20 
goods only using monies from their contributions and not using monies from dues, the level of 
government grants ought not to respond to the level of dues.
29 
An additional consideration involves the response of the charity itself to exogenous 
changes in receipt of grants and/or donations.  A growing literature examines, in particular, how 
a charity's expenditures on fundraising for private donations change in response to changes in 
government grants (Andreoni and Payne 2003, 2009).  Fundraising is thus included in the 
regression where private donations are the independent variable.  Furthermore, this literature 
shows that fundraising expenditures are endogenously determined.  Therefore, I add instrumental 
variables for fundraising.  I use two different variables at the charity-level as instruments for 
fundraising expenditures.  First, I use the amount of administrative expenditures reported by a 
charity on the Form 990.
30  Since the same personnel can be employed to do both administrative 
and fundraising tasks, the two types of expenditures may be correlated.  In years when an 
organization has a higher level of management expenses, it is likely to be able to spend more 
effort and money on fundraising; the first stage regression results support this claim (see the 
Appendix tables).  Furthermore, the level of private donations that a charity receives in a given 
year ought not to be affected by management expenses, since management expenses are 
expressly not those expenses used in soliciting funds (i.e., fundraising expenses).
31  Second, I use 
the total liabilities of the charity reported in the current year.  The idea behind this instrument is 
that it measures the financial security of the organization, which will help determine its 
fundraising strategy independent of private or public funding. A charity that in a particular year 
faces a less secure financial status (as measured by higher total liabilities) may seek to increase 
its fundraising expenditures to compensate; this claim is verified in first stage regression results.  
A charity's financial security could directly affect its level of private donations if donors respond 
to this level of financial security (e.g. a donor does not want to give money to a charity that is on 
                                                 
29 An alternative instrument for private donations is a measure of the price of a dollar of charitable donation based 
on the state's income tax and rules for allowing deductions of those contributions.  This, however, is a poor 
instrument because the donations to a charity in a particular state do not necessarily come from donors within that 
state, because tax rates are heterogeneous within a state, and because tax rates are likely to be directly correlated 
with government budgets and hence grants to charities.   
30 According to the instructions for the Form 990, administrative expenses, or "management and general" expenses, 
are a charity's "expenses for overall organization and management, rather than for its direct conduct of fundraising 
activities or program services." 
31 Breman (2006) uses the same variable to instrument for fundraising expenses in a data set from Swedish charities.  
She notes that in the Swedish data, some of the management expenses are used towards soliciting government 
grants.  In the US data from the Form 990s used here, however, this is not the case.  Thus, for my application, where 
fundraising expenses are an endogenous determinant of private donations, the exogeneity assumption is justified.   21 
the verge of collapse).  However, it is unlikely that donors have information on the 
contemporaneous financial conditions of a charity, at least not to the extent that a charity has.  
Donors may perceive an overall level of a charity's well being, but this is controlled for with a 
charity fixed effect.
 32 
For all of these instrumental variables, I report the first stage regression results in the 
Appendix.  In the main regression tables, I report the F-statistic in the instruments from the first 
stage regressions, the Hansen overidentification test J-statistic, and the Cragg-Donald F-statistic 
for weak instruments.   
 
V. Results 
  The results for these instrumental variables, fixed effects model regressions are presented 
in Tables 2 and 3.  Table 2 presents the results from regressions where private donations are the 
dependent variable and government grants are the regressor; Table 3 presents the results from 
regressions where these are reversed.  In column 1 are the base case results, using the full sample 
of cleaned data.  The tables report the F-statistic for the significance of the instruments in the 
first-stage of the regression; in almost all regressions, the instruments are highly significant.  
First stage results are reported in Appendix Tables A3, A4, and A5.  The reported standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, using a Newey-West kernel-based estimator 
of the variance matrix.
33 
  The coefficient of interest in the regressions in Table 2 is that of government grants.  The 
theory is indeterminate about the sign of this coefficient.  Absent government signaling of 
charity quality, it should be negative, indicating crowding out.  Signaling can cause crowding in, 
making the coefficient positive.  In the first column, the coefficient is positive though not quite 
statistically significant (the p-value is 0.102).  This is evidence for crowding in rather than 
crowding out, consistent with results found by Khanna and Sandler (2000) and Payne (2001), 
and consistent with the signaling effect dominating the crowding out effect, as in the model of 
Section 2.  Program service revenue is positively correlated with private donations in most 
columns, and other revenues are negatively correlated with private donations, though neither is 
                                                 
32 This same argument is made in Andreoni and Payne (2009), who use this variable as an instrument for fundraising 
along with another variable that is unavailable in my dataset: occupancy expenses. 
33 See Hayashi (2000), p. 408-410.   22 
statistically significant.  Fundraising expenditures increase private donations.  The coefficients 
on the state- and county-year level controls are generally insignificant.   
  Columns 2 through 6 present robustness checks by contracting or expanding the data 
sample.  The model of crowding out depends on either governments or individuals being able to 
respond to the level of giving from the other.  Thus, an effect of timing might not be captured 
entirely in this static model.  Therefore, I use lagged values for the endogenous regressor and 
instruments in column 2.  This lowers the coefficient value, and it becomes insignificant.  This 
suggests that the crowding in effect occurs within the fiscal year, rather than as a lagged effect. 
It is possible that the effect of crowding out or crowding in as well as the other control 
variables and instruments are only applicable to a subset of the charities, for two reasons.  First, 
while some of the controls and instruments are at the state-year level, not all of the charities 
operate only in the state where they are registered.  Many are national organizations that accept 
donations and possibly government grants from other states.  For these charities, the instruments 
are unlikely to be good predictors.  Though I cannot know for certain which organizations are 
national and which are local, column 3 excludes those whose names begin with "National," 
"American," or "North American."  I also exclude organizations classified as support 
organizations under the NTEE taxonomy.
34  These organizations do not directly provide services 
but support organizations or individuals who do provide services through management and 
technical assistance, fundraising, and public policy analysis.  Second, many of the charities 
receive no government grants throughout the entire six-year sample period, and many receive no 
private donations throughout the period.  Such charities are likely to receive no funding at all 
from one of these two sources, even in response to a change in the other funding source, and thus 
I also exclude them from the regressions in this column.
35 Limiting the sample in this way 
slightly increases the magnitude of the coefficient, and it maintains about the same level of 
significance.   
Column 4 limits the dataset in another way.  Some types of nonprofits in the dataset may 
not truly be providing public goods, though they are granted nonprofit status.  For example, it is 
                                                 
34 These are organizations whose last two digits of the NTEE centile code are less than 20. 
35 Instead of eliminating charities with no private donations or government grants, one could restrict the sample to 
include only charities whose revenues are not too imbalanced between public and private donations.  Charities 
which receive a large majority of their funding from one source or the other may respond less to changes in revenues 
than charities whose revenues are more balanced.  The results from regressions with this restriction are similar to 
results presented in Tables 2 and 3.   23 
debatable whether arts organizations, such as theatre companies or symphony orchestras, provide 
output that can be categorized as a public good.
36  While the data set here does not contain arts 
organizations, it includes some types of charities whose claim to providing public goods may be 
similarly suspect.  The organizations that I consider to fall into this category and that are dropped 
from the regressions reported in column 4 include low-income and subsidized rental housing, 
senior citizens' housing and retirement communities, residential care and adult day programs 
(including adult day care and hospice), and centers to support the independence of specific 
populations (including senior centers, developmentally disabled centers, and homeless centers).  
In this regression, the coefficient on government grants is again positive and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
Column 5 presents regression results when the data set is limited using a different 
criterion.  Outliers are always problematic, and perhaps they are especially problematic for these 
data.  I have already eliminated charities and observations for which there is clear evidence of 
accounting or reporting error, for example those whose summed categorical revenues do not add 
up to the reported total revenues.  Even absent these obvious irregularities, though, one may 
worry about charities reporting unusually high levels of donations or grants.  In column 5, I 
eliminate the influence of the largest charities by dropping from the sample those observations 
whose private donations are in the top 5% of the total distribution and those observations whose 
government grants are in the top 5%.  This refinement does not substantially change the 
regression results.  Finally, under data cleaning a large fraction of organizations were removed 
for not being in the panel for all six years.  Column 6 thus replicates the regression results 
without removing charities based on the number of years in which they appear in the dataset.  
The coefficient of interest, on government grants, is larger by about a factor of two from the 
previous columns, but is no longer significant.       
Overall, Table 2 suggests that a dollar increase in government grants to a charity 
increases the charity's private donations by about 15 to 30 cents.  Though generally significant at 
only the 10% level, the results are robust to different specifications of the data sample.  Table 2 
presents the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first-stage regression; 
they are strongly significant in all columns.  Table 2 also presents the Hansen J test statistic from 
                                                 
36 Although refer to the point made earlier in footnote 7, that private consumption of goods becomes a public good if 
donors are motivated by altruism for its recipients.   24 
a test of overidentifying restrictions, possible because the number of instruments exceeds the 
number of endogenous regressors.  The null hypothesis of this test is that the instruments are 
valid, so a rejection calls into question the validity of the instruments.  The null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected in any columns.  Table 2 also presents the value of the Cragg-Donald F-
statistic from Stock and Yogo (2005), a test for weak instruments.  It should be noted that, 
though the F-statistics on the instruments from the first stage regression are high, the Cragg-
Donald F-statistics are quite low compared to their critical values.  
  Table 3 presents the regressions in the opposite direction, where the level of government 
grants is the dependent variable and the level of private donations is the endogenous regressor.  
Column 1 is the base case, column 2 is with lagged regressors and instruments, columns 3 
through 5 limit the sample as described above, and column 6 includes the unbalanced panel.  The 
coefficient of interest is on private donations and is negative in five out of the six columns, but it 
is not significantly different from zero in any of these columns.  The magnitude of the point 
estimate is large; private donations crowd out government grants by 30% to 190%.  Thus 
evidence exists for a large crowding out effect of private donations on government grants, but the 
evidence is weak.  Furthermore, the regression results from column 5, which eliminate the top 
5% of charities measured by government grants or private donations, give a positive coefficient 
that is significant at the 10% level.  The results in this direction are thus both mixed and weak.  
Other regressors are more significant.  Program service revenue is negatively correlated with 
government grants, as is the county unemployment rate.  The F-statistics on the instrument in the 
first stage regression is lower, which in part leads to the imprecise second stage estimates of the 
coefficient on the endogenous regressor.  The large Cragg-Donald statistics indicate that, though 
the instruments are somewhat weak, the 2SLS results are not misleading. 
  In addition to being robust to these alternative sample specifications, all results are robust 
to estimation by LIML instead of 2SLS and to tests of weak instruments based on the conditional 
likelihood ratio from Moreira (2003), though these regression results are not reported.
37  Results 
are also robust to estimating the equations simultaneously using 3SLS.
 38 
 
                                                 
37 Software for implementing the Moreira (2003) test of weak instruments is available on Moreira's website: 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/moreira/softwaresimulations.html.  In general, the weak instrument 
problem only appears with a large number of (weak) instruments (Bound et. al. 1995). 
38 Monte Carlo studies comparing system estimators to equation-by-equation estimators have found that the 
efficiency advantages of the former are modest in finite samples (see Greene 2003, p. 451).   25 
Regression Results by Charity Type 
  One may be interested to test for differences in these results between types of charities, or 
one may worry that the results are being driven by only one particular type of charity.  Tables 4 
and 5 repeat the first columns of Table 2 and 3, respectively, but split up the data set into the six 
NTEE major groups represented in the full sample.  The six types are listed in the top row of the 
tables.  Table 4 shows that for three of the six types of charities, there is statistically significant 
crowding in of government grants: crime and legal-related, food, agriculture and nutrition, and 
human services.  The highest rate of crowding in occurs in food, agriculture and nutrition 
charities, and the lowest statistically significant crowding in rate occurs in human services 
charities.  Human services charities account for the majority of all charities (15,130 out of 
29,138).  Table 5 shows results for regressions in the opposite direction, where government 
grants are the dependent variable.  Like the results from Table 3, these results are mixed and 
generally insignificant.  Only for crime and legal-related charities is the coefficient on private 
donations significant, and it is positive.  Three of the six charity groups show positive 
coefficients, and three show negative coefficients.    
 
Crowding in by Charity Age 
  The analysis finds that government grants crowd in private donations for these charities.  
This is consistent with the signaling model but not exclusively.  As mentioned above, Rose-
Ackerman (1986) describes several competing theories for crowding in.  The signaling 
explanation depends upon uncertainty among donors as to the quality of the charity that is 
cleared up after the grant provides a signal.  Thus identifying a measure of uncertainty about the 
quality of a charity will be beneficial in supporting the signaling theory: charities about which 
individuals know less should experience larger crowding in effects than charities that are well 
known.  How can the "uncertainty" about a charity be measured?   
I use the age of the charity, as measured by the date that the IRS bestowed it nonprofit 
status.  Older charities are likely to be better known by donors.  If so, the signaling effect for 
older charities should be smaller than for younger charities.  By interacting a charity's age with 
the value of government grants, I can determine if the crowding in from government grants   26 
depends on age.
39  The results for this exercise are presented in Table 6, which reports results 
from regressions where private donations are the dependent variable, government grants and 
fundraising expenditures are endogenous regressors, and the same instruments and controls are 
used as in Table 2 (though not reported).  Additionally, charity age and an interaction of age with 
grants are included.
40  These results support the theory, with significant results everywhere 
except for column 2.  The coefficient on government grants is positive and varies between about 
0.8 to 1.3.  The coefficient on age indicates that a charity aging by one year increases its 
donations by between $2,500 and $14,000, though the coefficient is not significant.  Finally, the 
coefficient on the interaction term is strongly significant in all columns and indicates that the 
crowding in effect decreases by less than half a cent to four cents on the dollar per year the 
charity has been around.  In the first four columns, the ratio of the coefficient on government 
grants and the coefficient on the interaction term indicates that grants crowd in private donations 
for charities younger than 40 years old and crowd out donations for charities older than 40.  In 
the last column this figure is closer to 30 years old.  This supports the theory that older charities 
receive less of a signal from receipt of grants, and so the value of crowding in is less.
41  
However, in all of these regression results, like in those from Table 2, the Cragg-Donald F-
statistics are quite low, suggesting weak instruments. 
 
Contemporaneous and Cumulative Grants 
  The model and econometrics are both static.  Though either the government or 
individuals can move first, after each party has moved one time the game ends.  Since charities 
exist for many years, the effects from crowding out or from signaling are likely to last for more 
than just a single fiscal year.  It thus seems appropriate to consider dynamic extensions of the 
effects that I have found theoretically and empirically.  While I do not provide a rigorous 
                                                 
39 An alternative measure of charity uncertainty might be generated using publicly available ratings of charities from 
organizations such as Charity Navigator.  These organizations only cover a very small fraction of charities and have 
not been around long enough to cover all years in the data set. 
40The age variable is unavailable for 7.4% of organizations, and it is clearly inaccurate (i.e. shows an origination 
date later than 1998, when the charity was in existence and filing tax returns) for an additional 1.1%, thus the 
number of observations in these regressions is lower than in previous tables.  
41 Crowding in should also be expected if government funding comes in the form of matching grants.  
Unfortunately, no information about matching is available in the data.  Some of the crowding in phenomenon may 
be explained by matching grants, though matching grants do not explain why crowding in is less for older charities 
(unless they receive a lower fraction of their government grants in the form of matching grants).  Matching, in the 
context of intergovernmental grants, is studied in Baicker and Staigler (2005), Klor (2006), and Huber and Runkel 
(2006).   27 
treatment of a dynamic model here, I offer the following observation.  One would expect that the 
signaling effect described in section 2 is likely to be cumulative over time: a grant signaling high 
quality in period t will positively influence donations not just in period t but also in periods t+1, 
t+2, etc.  This is because the quality of a public good is persistent over time.  Whether or not the 
crowding out effect is cumulative or merely contemporaneous depends upon whether the utility 
from the public good is from a stock or a flow good.  If a flow good, then the crowding out from 
government grants in period t will negatively affect private donations only in period t.  If the 
public good is a stock good, then the government grants in period t will crowd out donations in 
future periods as well.  Thus, the two effects of government grants found here, from both 
crowding out and signaling, are likely to be long lasting, and the duration of the effect for each 
may differ.   
  This is tested empirically in Table 7 by regressing private donations (in year  t) on both 
contemporaneous government grants (from year  t)  and on cumulative government grants (the 
sum of grants to a charity in all years up to  t – 1).  Each regression in Table 7 includes all of the 
same controls and instruments as in Table 2, though they are not reported.  In all three columns, 
the coefficient on contemporaneous grants is significantly positive, ranging from 17 cents to 26 
cents on the dollar.  In none of the columns is the coefficient on cumulative government grants 
significant though it is always less than zero.  This suggests that the crowding in effect is in fact 
contemporaneous; private donors respond to the current year's level of government grants and 
not lagged values.  An alternative way to look dynamically at the data, to see if current values of 
donations, say, are affected by lagged values of government grants, is through a vector 
autoregression (VAR).  However, testing for Granger causality in either direction using panel 
data VAR methods developed in Holtz-Eakin et. al. (1988) fails to find causality from lagged 
values of government grants or private donations.  The data used are annual, limiting how much 
the effect of timing can be observed.  If a grant early in one year affects donations later in the 
same fiscal year, then that dynamic response cannot be measured with annual data.  There are 





                                                 
42 Garrett and Rhine (2008) perform VARs on time series data of aggregate annual private donations and 
government grants to charities.   28 
  The effect of crowding out of private donations by government grants, proposed in Warr 
(1982) and Roberts (1984), and extended to include a warm glow effect in Andreoni (1989, 
1990), has had numerous empirical investigations.  Many studies, including Kingma (1989) and 
Payne (1998) find significant evidence of partial crowding out.  Other papers, including Khanna 
and Sandler (2000) and Payne (2001), find some evidence of crowding in of private donations.  
Though their results differ, most of these papers have in common that they use a relatively small 
sample of charities, and they test for crowding out or crowding in only in one direction. 
  Here I extend that literature by looking at a large data set that includes most charities that 
file Form 990 with the IRS, which includes all non-religious charities with at least $25,000 in 
gross receipts.  The first main contribution is the empirical examination of crowding out in the 
"opposite direction": private donations crowding out government grants.  Theoretically, I show 
that the crowding out effect depends on whether the government or individuals make their 
contributions first.  The second main contribution is showing that government grants can act as 
signals for charity quality, leading to crowding in.  Empirically, I find evidence that government 
grants crowd in private donations, while private donations crowd out government grants.   
  Though the signaling model assumes that governments have the private information on 
charity quality initially, under the assumption that individuals have that information it can easily 
be shown that it would predict crowding in in the opposite direction, from private donations to 
government grants.  The model could be further extended by supposing that the information is 
initially unknown to either the government or individuals, but that anyone can obtain the 
information at a cost. The cost may differ between individuals and governments.
43  An empirical 
extension to this paper is to test for private donations signaling information on charity quality by 
taking advantage of two types of private donations: those from individuals and those from 
private foundations.  Foundations (or trusts, corporations, or estates) are likely to devote 
resources to researching charities and thus may have information about the charity quality.  Their 
grants or donations to a charity may thus act as the quality signal in the same way that 
government grants do in this paper's model.  In fact, charities typically advertise receipt of grants 
from both governments and private organizations, indicating that they expect these 
announcements to crowd in donations.  Unfortunately, the data from the IRS Form 990s do not 
allow this level of disaggregating.  Contributions from individuals, as well as trusts, 
                                                 
43 This cost is modeled in Andreoni (2006), but with no distinction between private donors and government.     29 
corporations, estates, and foundations, are all listed under the same category of "direct public 
support," according to the IRS instructions for completing the form.  The category "indirect 
public support" includes only contributions collected from "federated fundraising agencies" such 
as the United Way (Figure 1 shows that this category represents only a small amount of total 
revenues).  If private donations disaggregated into contributions from individuals and 
contributions from private foundations or trusts were available from another data source, then 
this extension may give empirical support to private donations acting as signals.  Another 
extension would be to consider a model of multiple public goods, rather than the modeling here 
of a single public good, as is common in the literature.
44  How government and individuals 
respond to changes in contributions among different types of charities is a question worth 
exploring.
 45  The regression results for different types of charities in Table 4 suggest that this 
may be a fruitful line of research. 
  What are the policy implications of these findings?  Governments fund public goods, 
including but not limited to those provided by charities, and hopefully governments would do so 
to increase social welfare by overcoming the free rider problem inherent in public goods.  The 
large prior literature on crowding out suggests that governments ought to acknowledge the effect 
that their giving has on private giving and set their level of grants appropriately.  The signaling 
model and empirical results presented here buttress that suggestion and add that the government's 
grants can influence individuals' donations not only through their effect on the level of the public 
good provision but also through their effect on individuals' information about the quality of the 
public good.  Governments should "worry" about the negative effect that their grants can have 
due to crowding out; they should also "worry" about how the signal value of their grants can 
have positive effects on giving.  The paper's results are also relevant to private donors, especially 
large donors like foundations who may influence government grants or other private donations 
through the crowding in or crowding out effects of their contributions.  
  A number of additional questions, clarifying these effects and the appropriate policy 
responses for governments and private donors, may be answered in further research.  I have 
                                                 
44 Exceptions which do consider multiple public goods include Bergstrom et. al. (1986), Mutuswami and Winter 
(2004), and Ghosh et. al. (2007). 
45 Even among charities of similar types, there can be different crowding out or crowding in effects.  Parker and 
Thurman (2008) find both crowding out and crowding in for two different government programs preserving open 
space, and Albers et. al. (2008) examine public provision of land reserves and find crowding in in California and 
crowding out in Illinois and Massachusetts.  Payne (2001) finds crowding out of government grants to teaching 
colleges but crowding in for research universities.   30 
identified that government grants crowd in private donations for the charities in this data set, and 
I have supplied some evidence that this crowding in arises from the signaling value of the 
government grants.  Further research could verify that signaling is the true cause of crowding in 
or examine other potential reasons for crowding in, for example economies of scale in a charity's 
provision of public goods.  This may be answered using similar data on actual contributions or in 
a controlled laboratory setting.  Further research could also address the question of the disparity 
in results between the many papers that find crowding out of private donations and the many, 
including this one, that find crowding in.  An extension using data from other charities besides 
social service charities would be useful.  Finally, development of a thorough theoretical model to 
capture the many effects that could cause crowding in or crowding out in either direction, that 
may include charity fundraising, multiple public goods or charities, and dynamics, would be a 
helpful addition to the literature. 
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Notes:  Investment income includes interest and dividends; rents and sales includes securities and inventory; other 







Notes:  All dollar values are deflated by CPI, and are mean (per nonprofit) values. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics – Charity Revenues and Fundraising 















Full Sample             
  339,716  76,725         
Private Donations      334  4790  44  165 
Government Grants      521  3476  0  156 
Program Service 
Revenue 
    972  9413  61  396 
Other Revenue      111  1345  8  43 
Fundraising 
Expenditures 
    25  510  0  2 
Cleaned Sample             
  174,828  29,138         
Private Donations      267  799  41  206 
Government Grants      431  1296  0  241 
Program Service 
Revenue 
    755  1833  117  562 
Other Revenue      89  384  12  56 
Fundraising 
Expenditures 
    21  103  0  4 
Notes: Data are averaged over 1998-2003 in constant 2002 dollars.  Private donations include direct and indirect 
public support.  Other revenue includes interest, rents and sales.   
    
Table 2 
The Determinants of Private Donations
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Government Grants  0.154  0.00208  0.165  0.283***  0.211*  0.482 
  (0.0941)  (0.182)  (0.107)  (0.0751)  (0.111)  (0.407) 
Fundraising Expenditures  6.698  1.542  4.477  2.892  5.670*  -4.888 
  (5.585)  (9.164)  (7.437)  (4.143)  (3.332)  (16.93) 
Program Service Revenue  0.00640  -0.0209  0.0525  0.0377  -0.00312  0.106 
  (0.0349)  (0.0328)  (0.0579)  (0.0267)  (0.0112)  (0.132) 
Other Revenues  -0.0165  -0.0123  -0.0183  -0.0181  -0.0190  -0.0108 
  (0.0141)  (0.0283)  (0.0184)  (0.0240)  (0.0147)  (0.0111) 
Population  0.00263  0.00116  0.00560  0.00252  -0.000555  -0.00132 
  (0.00410)  (0.00750)  (0.00765)  (0.00529)  (0.00119)  (0.000996) 
Income  0.317  -0.136  -0.0225  -0.360  0.306  5.074 
  (0.867)  (1.471)  (1.671)  (1.076)  (0.208)  (3.789) 
Unemployment Rate  -4665  -2014  -2984  -1224  -1473  5251 
  (4580)  (5099)  (7978)  (4811)  (1417)  (4383) 
Percent Population > 65  -80565  -1169434  -807630  -1943548  354411  -1591628 
  (1.60e+06)  (1.91e+06)  (2.90e+06)  (1.63e+06)  (444321)  (2.32e+06) 
Number Dem Senators  -3244  -5964  -8585  -1954  2553*  659.6 
  (4379)  (8327)  (6313)  (5363)  (1490)  (5500) 
Percent Congress members Dem  12746  21424  11020  -9720  3601  -1442 
  (20715)  (19608)  (32663)  (26427)  (7289)  (28046) 
Indicator for Democratic governor  -7895  2353  -18864***  -8447  -2505  -8960* 
  (5081)  (4863)  (6641)  (6348)  (1644)  (4849) 
Observations  174828  145690  85764  111474  158016  264494 
Number of Organizations  29138  29138  14300  18579  27187  52570 
             
F-statistic on instruments for government grants 
in first-stage regression
b 
23.74  15.77  15.66  11.53  19.01  29.36 
 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
F-statistic on instruments for fundraising 
expenditures in first-stage regression
c 
8.72  7.41  5.84  5.82  3.28  9.06   38 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.000) 
Hansen J-statistic  1.037  1.531  1.292  1.431  2.172  3.443 
(p-value)  (0.595)  (0.465)  (0.524)  (0.489)  (0.338)  (0.179) 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic  1.793  1.119  0.916  2.532  1.525  0.539 
Lagged Endogenous Variable/Instrument?  No  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Exclude Select Charities?
d  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Balanced Panel?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
a Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years (except column 6), whose reported categorical revenues sum 
up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount in a revenue category.  Year indicator variables are included in each 
regression.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
b Instruments for government grants are the state-year total payments paid to individuals through SSI and the state-year payments paid to individuals through SSI 
for the aged.   
c Instruments for fundraising expenditures are the charity's management expenditures and its total liabilities. 
d Column 3 excludes charities that include "National" or "American" in their names, are classified as support organizations, or never have nonzero values for 
government grants or private donations.  Column 4 excludes organizations classified as low-income and subsidized rental housing, senior citizens' housing and 
retirement communities, residential care and adult day programs, and centers to support the independence of specific populations.  Column 5 excludes 
observations where the level of government grants or the level of private donations is in the top 5% among all observations.  
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Table 3 
The Determinants of Government Grants
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Private Donations  -0.700  -1.143  -1.931  -1.123  0.665*  -0.307 
  (1.165)  (1.212)  (2.667)  (1.334)  (0.342)  (0.923) 
Program Service Revenue  -0.279***  -0.279***  -0.498***  -0.289***  -0.0422***  -0.253*** 
  (0.0308)  (0.0304)  (0.0466)  (0.0522)  (0.00513)  (0.0234) 
Other Revenues  -0.0327  -0.0197  -0.0468  -0.0143  -0.00427  -0.00526 
  (0.0293)  (0.0231)  (0.0641)  (0.0287)  (0.00396)  (0.0134) 
Population  0.00789  -0.000255  0.0258  0.0126  0.000182  0.00209*** 
  (0.00695)  (0.00554)  (0.0269)  (0.00945)  (0.00176)  (0.000796) 
Income  -1.356  -1.127  -4.438  -1.879  -0.488**  -4.388* 
  (0.938)  (1.186)  (4.416)  (1.834)  (0.230)  (2.550) 
Unemployment Rate  -2276  1910  -3170  -4788  -1404*  -11528*** 
  (1921)  (5441)  (5064)  (3142)  (754.3)  (2611) 
Percent Population > 65  -2171059  -3317986  -9332267  -2355580  -125400  -904656 
  (2.45e+06)  (3.20e+06)  (8.83e+06)  (3.77e+06)  (277585)  (1.13e+06) 
Number Dem Senators  4118  -1281  -10013  2025  -2201  4587 
  (4682)  (14177)  (21595)  (7926)  (1549)  (3302) 
Percent Congress members Dem  54497*  124182*  204517*  72447*  9239  20125 
  (33102)  (73427)  (115870)  (40320)  (7931)  (18596) 
Indicator for Dem governor  10200  20923***  7014  17028*  3959**  11030* 
  (7092)  (7514)  (30070)  (8749)  (1987)  (6283) 
Observations  174828  145690  85764  111474  158016  265105 
Number of Organizations  29138  29138  14300  18579  27187  52689 
             
F-statistic on instruments in first-
stage regression
b 
4.88  4.30  2.10  4.60  8.99  5.92 
(p-value)  (0.027)  (0.038)  (0.147)  (0.032)  (0.003)  (0.015) 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic  60.78  33.86  33.08  55.61  29.70  63.41 
Lagged Endogenous 
Variable/Instrument? 
No  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Exclude Select Charities?
c  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Balanced Panel?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No   40 
a Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years (except column 6), whose reported categorical revenues sum 
up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount in a revenue category.  Year indicator variables are included in each 
regression.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
b Instrument for private donations is the level of dues collected by the charity. 
c Column 3 excludes charities that include "National" or "American" in their names, are classified as support organizations, or never have nonzero values for 
government grants or private donations.  Column 4 excludes organizations classified as low-income and subsidized rental housing, senior citizens' housing and 
retirement communities, residential care and adult day programs, and centers to support the independence of specific populations.  Column 5 excludes 
observations where the level of government grants or the level of private donations is in the top 5% among all observations.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 




The Determinants of Private Donations, by Charity Type
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Type of Organization  Crime and 
Legal-Related 









Government Grants  0.358***  -0.0549  0.583**  -0.0169  0.156**  0.0680 
  (0.126)  (0.298)  (0.262)  (0.179)  (0.0661)  (0.269) 
Fundraising Expenditures  8.757  36.41  1.613  7.481  5.556  10.08 
  (5.346)  (25.50)  (4.336)  (7.157)  (4.172)  (12.58) 
Program Service Revenue  0.0311  -0.0609  0.191  -0.0264  0.0129  -0.0147 
  (0.0892)  (0.0914)  (0.143)  (0.0301)  (0.0327)  (0.0402) 
Other Revenues  -0.229*  -0.00888  0.0763  -0.0217  -0.0115  -0.0347 
  (0.127)  (0.0465)  (0.0704)  (0.0251)  (0.0182)  (0.0474) 
Population  -0.0287*  0.0120  -0.0164  0.00409  0.00512  0.00873 
  (0.0162)  (0.0268)  (0.0117)  (0.00638)  (0.00729)  (0.00680) 
Income  8.110  2.291  0.542  0.622  0.883  -0.666 
  (5.056)  (13.21)  (4.107)  (0.955)  (1.054)  (2.293) 
Unemployment Rate  1055  -19402  33679***  -2421  -6941  -7482 
  (12509)  (16939)  (12998)  (4384)  (4960)  (7067) 
Percent Population > 65  337267  6.23e+06  573697  -17303  -177165  -734748 
  (5.30e+06)  (1.15e+07)  (3.96e+06)  (754458)  (1.35e+06)  (7.32e+06) 
Number Dem Senators  -65185**  3086  -61006  2534  2153  859.3 
  (30336)  (29357)  (48021)  (5885)  (5364)  (15052) 
Percent Congress members Dem  -73604  -51456  -52636  34049  34709  -69063 
  (156417)  (129069)  (259774)  (25450)  (27369)  (73660) 
Indicator for Democratic governor  -21159  -135863  -27991  42.13  -5109  9609 
  (20187)  (88615)  (69216)  (9104)  (5941)  (19545) 
Observations  10206  9678  4644  37956  90780  21564 
Number of Organizations  1701  1613  774  6326  15130  3594 
             
F-statistic on instruments for  16.32  8.31  11.03  6.40  44.72  2.78   42 
government grants in first-stage 
regression
b 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
F-statistic on instruments for 
fundraising expenses in first-stage 
regression
c 
2.70  1.37  0.67  4.34  3.46  1.67 
(p-value)  (0.029)  (0.240)  (0.614)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.153) 
Hansen J-statistic  1.669  2.109  1.031  1.570  0.805  0.548 
(p-value)  (0.434)  (0.348)  (0.597)  (0.456)  (0.669)  (0.760) 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic  22.17  0.774  1.622  1.791  2.725  0.529 
a Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years (except column 6), whose reported categorical revenues sum 
up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount in a revenue category.  Year indicator variables are included in each 
regression.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
b Instruments for government grants are the state-year total payments paid to individuals through SSI and the state-year payments paid to individuals through SSI 
for the aged. 
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Table 5 
The Determinants of Government Grants, by Charity Type
a 
Type of Organization  Crime and 
Legal-Related 









Private Donations  1.825**  1.792  -1.528  1.178  -0.869  -0.148 
  (0.925)  (1.422)  (1.544)  (1.255)  (1.425)  (0.543) 
Program Service Revenue  -0.236*  -0.184***  -0.156*  -0.134***  -0.333***  -0.153** 
  (0.121)  (0.0507)  (0.0869)  (0.0419)  (0.0270)  (0.0686) 
Other Revenues  0.216  0.0475  -0.0801  -0.00879  -0.0449  0.0116 
  (0.158)  (0.0908)  (0.0773)  (0.0315)  (0.0392)  (0.0227) 
Population  0.0440*  -0.0270  -0.00167  -0.00329  0.0135  0.00286 
  (0.0241)  (0.0323)  (0.0271)  (0.00929)  (0.0144)  (0.00503) 
Income  -4.879  20.23  0.848  -3.243**  1.254  -1.194 
  (5.326)  (21.09)  (5.916)  (1.540)  (1.734)  (0.979) 
Unemployment Rate  -17843*  3373  45051  702.3  -2551  -3865 
  (10713)  (13471)  (48445)  (4640)  (3105)  (4793) 
Percent Population > 65  8.26e+06  -857914  -6648417  -508775  -4794988  5.94e+06 
  (5.44e+06)  (4.60e+06)  (7.53e+06)  (1.43e+06)  (3.35e+06)  (4.38e+06) 
Number Dem Senators  88831  19816  -66258  -887.8  3064  -1940 
  (54106)  (32198)  (109008)  (9957)  (8280)  (15671) 
Percent Congress members 
Dem 
398321**  -51909  -372464  -13832  77615  34785 
  (191056)  (165188)  (407575)  (55651)  (82715)  (55165) 
Indicator for Democratic 
governor 
80486**  16650  21644  19101  11411  8136 
  (35479)  (52050)  (65074)  (13218)  (9092)  (15671) 
Observations  10206  9678  4644  37956  90780  21564 
Number of Organizations  1701  1613  774  6326  15130  3594 
             
F-statistic on instruments in 
first-stage regression
b 
8.82  1.95  1.85  1.59  3.79  0.55   44 
(p-value)  (0.003)  (0.163)  (0.174)  (0.208)  (0.052)  (0.459) 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic  5.608  1.394  1.170  1.927  53.82  1.584 
a Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years (except column 6), whose reported categorical revenues sum 
up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount in a revenue category.  Year indicator variables are included in each 
regression.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
b Instrument for private donations is the level of dues collected by the charity. 
  
Table 6 
The Effect of Age on Crowding In 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Government Grants  0.959***  0.153  0.825**  1.283***  1.278*** 
  (0.366)  (0.211)  (0.345)  (0.375)  (0.334) 
Charity Age  8461  2513  10137  13862  5609 
  (9471)  (7762)  (13055)  (9782)  (4456) 
Age*Grants  -0.0254***  -0.00359*  -0.0207***  -0.0320***  -0.0421*** 
  (0.00877)  (0.00215)  (0.00735)  (0.00961)  (0.0101) 
Observations  159912  133260  78621  102024  144351 
Number of 
Organizations 
26652  26652  13108  17004  24837 
           
F-statistic on 
instruments for 
government grants in 
first-stage regression
 
13.65  10.23  8.34  8.00  8.42 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Hansen J-statistic  1.704  0.544  0.530  1.653  0.0650 
(p-value)  (0.426)  (0.762)  (0.767)  (0.438)  (0.968) 
Cragg-Donald F-
statistic 
0.912  1.174  0.847  2.552  0.578 
Lagged Endogenous 
Variable/Instrument? 




No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
a Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years (except column 
6), whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never 
report a negative amount in a revenue category.  Only those charities with a consistent value for age are included.  
Instruments and control variables from Table 2 all appear in these regressions, though not reported.  
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
b Column 3 excludes charities that include "National" or "American" in their names, are classified as support 
organizations, or never have nonzero values for government grants or private donations.  Column 4 excludes 
organizations classified as low-income and subsidized rental housing, senior citizens' housing and retirement 
communities, residential care and adult day programs, and centers to support the independence of specific 
populations.  Column 5 excludes observations where the level of government grants or the level of private donations 
is in the top 5% among all observations.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 
Contemporaneous and Cumulative Grants
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Government Grants  0.208***  0.167***  0.263*** 
  (0.0400)  (0.0420)  (0.0594) 
Cumulative Government Grants  -0.00224  -0.000931  -0.00429 
  (0.00197)  (0.00230)  (0.00294) 
Observations  145690  71472  92895 
Number of Observations  29138  14300  18579 
       
F-statistic on instruments in first-stage regression
  36.63  43.03  22.04 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Hansen J-statistic  6.625  11.96  7.487 
(p-value)  (0.0848)  (0.00752)  (0.0579) 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic  816.3  717.2  458.0 
Exclude Select Charities?
b  No  Yes  Yes 
a Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years (except column 
6), whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never 
report a negative amount in a revenue category.  Instruments and control variables from Table 2 all appear in these 
regressions, though not reported.  Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
b Column 2 excludes charities that include "National" or "American" in their names, are classified as support 
organizations, or never have nonzero values for government grants or private donations.  Column 3 excludes 
organizations classified as low-income and subsidized rental housing, senior citizens' housing and retirement 
communities, residential care and adult day programs, and centers to support the independence of specific 
populations. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix – Not for Publication 
 
Consider the model from Section 1, without information asymmetry.  First, suppose that 
all of the individuals and the government move simultaneously, resulting in a Nash equilibrium.  
Since both the government and each individual act as though the other's action is fixed at the 
equilibrium level, the maximization problems and the first order conditions for each party are 
identical to those in Section 1.  Thus, the first order conditions for an interior solution are a 
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0     for  i = 1,…,N  for the government's problem 
and  Uc = UG  for each individual  i.  This is a large system of equations that is impossible to 
solve without parameterizing the utility function.  By assuming homogeneity of individuals, 
though, an interesting result emerges.  With identical individuals all making a contribution  g,  
and the government setting an identical tax  τ  on each of them, the government's first order 
condition simplifies to Uc = NUG.  This is inconsistent with the individuals' first order condition 
for an interior solution.  By considering corner solutions through the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, it 
can be shown that individuals give nothing in equilibrium:  g = 0.  The government sets a 
positive tax level to maximize social welfare.  Why does this corner solution always hold?  
Under homogeneity of individuals, the same level of utility is achieved whether funding the 
public good through private donations  g  or through taxes  τ.  Thus, the government can set  τ  to 
achieve the first-best, totally compensating for the free rider problem.  This is in general not 
possible when the two sources of funding for the public good are not perfect substitutes, for 
example, if a warm glow effect accrues from private donations. 
  A second equilibrium concept occurs when the government is the first mover, followed 
by all individuals moving simultaneously, resulting in a Stackelberg equilibrium.
46  The 
maximization problem and first order condition for each individual are the same as before, since 
individuals are second movers and take the government's and each other's actions as exogenous.  
The government, however, chooses both the tax and the individuals' private donations, subject to 
the individuals' maximizing behavior.  The government’s problem is thus 
                                                 
46 This is similar to Varian's (1994) modeling of sequential private contributions to public goods.  That model has no 
government, though, and only two individuals.  He shows that the level of public good provision is weakly lower 
under sequential contributions than under simultaneous contributions.  Here, I allow the government to move either 
before or after individuals, but all individuals move simultaneously with each other.   48 
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where μi  is individual  i's  constraint that  gi ≥ 0, coming from the first order conditions of the 
individual's maximization problem.  Because of the inequality constraints on both  g  and  τ,  the 
first order conditions for this problem are complicated.   
  Another Stackelberg equilibrium occurs when the government sets the tax after all of the 
individuals have chosen their level of private contributions.  In the first stage, all  N  individuals 
move simultaneously, and in the second stage the government moves.  The government's 
maximization problem and first order condition are the same as in the case where individuals' 
actions are exogenous, since those actions are given at the time of the government decisions.  
The individuals must each choose a level of private contribution, factoring in how their 
contribution affects the government's choice of tax, holding constant all other individuals' 
contributions.  Individual  i's maximization problem is 

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The constraint is the first order condition of the government's optimization problem, assuming an 
interior solution.  Individual  i  chooses  τ  subject to the constraint but can only affect  τ  insofar 
as  gi  is changed.  Though the first order conditions are relatively easy to find, any further 
analysis of this equilibrium is impossible without assuming any form on the utility function.   
Finally, I evaluate the social planner's problem, where each individual’s level of private 
contribution and the tax are set simultaneously by one agent.  The maximization problem is 
 
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The first best solution thus depends on how each individual is weighted in the social welfare 
function, described by the  γi  parameters.  In the special case where all individuals are identical, 
the problem becomes 
)) ( , ( max
0 , 0 g N g y U
g   
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 . 
Again, here  g  and  τ  are perfect substitutes, so government need only choose the sum  τ + g, or 
each individual's total contribution to  G.  This leads to the first order condition  Uc = NUG.  The 
marginal cost to each individual,  Uc,  is set to equal the social marginal benefit, which accrues to 
all N individuals,  NUG.     49 
  Next, consider extending individuals' preferences to allow for a warm glow effect, or 
impure altruism.
47  As in Andreoni (1990), this is done by amending the individual's utility 
function to include the individual's level of voluntary contribution as an argument.  Thus, the 
utility function is  U(ci, gi, G).  Given an exogenous tax schedule, the individual's first order 
condition is now  –Uc + Ug + UG = 0.  The middle term accounts for the fact that the individual 
earns warm glow utility from the level of giving  gi,  separate from the benefit directly received 
by the public good  G.  The individual does not receive this warm glow from mandatory 
contributions to the public good (taxes).   
  The first order condition can be used to find the effect of a change in the individual's tax 
rate  τi: 
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In general, this cannot be signed.  The numerator is positive, and the denominator is equal to the 
negative of the numerator plus three additional terms: Ugg + UgG – Ucg.  If this additional sum is 
negative, then the total derivative above must be between  –1  and  0.  That is, crowding out 
exists but is less than one-for-one.  The intuition is that government and private provision of the 
public good are no longer perfect substitutes in utility because of the warm glow effect, and thus 
we would not expect perfect crowding out.  The sufficient condition for partial crowding out to 
hold is satisfied as long as  UgG  is not too large (the other two terms are negative).  That is, if 
UgG  is too big, then a decrease in government spending on the public good  (G)  reduces the 
marginal utility of the warm glow effect  (Ug)  enough so that the individual reduces his or her 
private giving. 
  Consider next the case where individuals' actions are exogenous and the government's tax 
structure is endogenous in the context of a warm glow effect.  Suppose further that the 
government sets an identical tax  τ  on every individual.
48  The government’s problem is 
                                                 
47 An alternative extension, yet with similar effects, is to consider reputation effects, as in Benabou and Tirole 
(2006).  See also Kotchen (2006). 
48 The most general form of the tax allows for the government to set a different tax for each individual.  However, 
this generality makes the evaluation of derivatives difficult.  To evaluate  dτi/dgi  using the implicit function 
theorem, one must calculate the inverse of an  N × N  matrix (from the  N  first order conditions).   50 
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49  This yields the 







G c i U U
1 1
0 ) (  .  The social marginal cost of increasing the tax on 
individual  i  is the foregone value of consumption for that person.  This equals the marginal 
benefit of increasing the tax, which is the value of the increase in the public good.  This benefit 
accrues to each person’s utility function, and hence it is summed over  N.  Use the implicit 
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The denominator of this expression is strictly negative.  With no warm glow effect, the 
numerator is strictly positive, which implies that private donations crowd out public spending.
50  
In fact, as long as  UgG < UcG,  crowding out must occur.  This condition is similar to that in the 
last section.  Again, crowding out must occur as long as the marginal utility from the public good  
(UG)  does not increase too much in the level of the warm glow effect  (g).  If so, then a reduction 
in private giving by individual  i  may reduce everyone's utility from the public good by enough 
so that the optimal tax decreases as well. 
  I next consider the case of a non-benevolent government, that is, a government whose 
maximand is not the social welfare function of the weighted sum of individuals' utility functions.  
One way in which the government's utility function could differ from the socially optimal is if 
the government uses weights different than those that are socially optimal.  If the true social 
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) , (  ,  where the new weights may represent a government corrupted by influence from 
                                                 
49 The condition on the utility function, that  Ux → ∞ as x → 0, ensures an interior solution for  gi  in the individual’s 
problem.  This does not ensure an interior solution for  τ,  however, since  τ  is not an argument of the utility 
function. 
50 Finding conditions for when crowding out is one-for-one is not appropriate in this context, since the tax rate 
applies to each individual.  If individual  i  increases his or her private contribution by one dollar, then a decrease of 
one dollar in the tax  τ would actually decrease the total amount of the public good by  (N – 1) dollars.    51 
some interest groups.  However, note that all of the results found in the paper are independent of 
the weights  γi .  Thus, this particular deviation from a benevolent government has no effect on 
the model's implications. 
  Consider instead an alternative formulation of a non-benevolent government.  Suppose 
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] ) , ( [    ,  so that the government directly 
receives utility from their tax levels  τi.  This could represent the outcome from lobbying by firms 
who contract for government services and who prefer government funding of public goods to 
private funding.  Note that this specification is analogous to the warm glow specification in 
household utility; here government can receive a warm glow from their tax expenditures on the 
public good.  The proof used in Section I to show that private donations perfectly crowd out 
government funding no longer applies, since government and private contributions to the public 
good are no longer perfect substitutes.  The first order condition for the government's choice of  
τi  is   

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N
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0    .  One could use the implicit function theorem on this series of 
first order conditions, but this would involved a large  N by N  matrix, for each of the  τi.  
Alternatively, one could assume a unified tax rate  τ,  as was done above for the impure altruism 
case.  If that assumption is taken, then the derivative above remains the same, except that all of 
the warm glow terms are dropped.  As described above, this still results in crowding out of 
private donations, though perhaps not at a one-for-one level. 
  Finally, I consider the endogenous response of a charity to changes in government grants 
or private donations.  Suppose that, in addition to a benevolent government and  N  private 
potential donors, there exists a charity who takes government grants and private donations and 
converts them into public goods.  The charity has access to fundraising technology, and uses it to 
solicit donors.  The charity can choose a level of fundraising effectiveness  θ,  which gives the 
fraction of individuals that are solicited by the charity.  To reach this level of fundraising they 
must pay  F(θ)  in fundraising costs, where  F  is increasing and convex.  A charity seeks to 
maximize the total payout to the public good less the amount that is being spent on fundraising; 
its maximand is   ) ( ) (
1
  F g
N
i
i i   

.  An individual donor is not aware of the charity or the 
public good unless she is solicited by the charity.  Let  zi = 1  if individual  i  is solicited and  zi =   52 
0  if not.  If  zi = 0,  then  gi = 0.  If  zi = 1,  then individual  i  chooses  gi  to maximize her utility 
given her tax rate  τi  as well as everyone else's tax rate and everyone else's level of contribution 
to the charity. 
  As shown in the models above, the order of movement among the government, the 
individuals, and here the charity is likely to matter.  Suppose that the government sets its tax 
levels  τi  exogenously, and then the charity responds by choosing  θ,  followed by all N 
individuals simultaneously.  A key difference between this model and the previous models is the 
stochastic element: the charity can choose  θ,  which gives the probability that any individual 
will be solicited.  Once the charity chooses this probability, the actual solicitations are realized 
and individuals respond.  Define the solicitation vector as  Z = (z1, z2, … zN)',  where each  zi  is 
defined as above.  The value of  θ  gives the probability of any  Z  being drawn, let this be  Pr(Z; 
θ).  Let the set of all possible solicitation vectors be  Σ.   
  Begin by solving the individual's maximization problem, given the taxes, the solicitation 
vector  Z,  and all other individuals' levels of giving.  As assumed, if  zi = 0, then  gi = 0.  If  zi = 
1, then individual  i  chooses  gi  to maximize  U(yi – gi – τi, Σ(gi + τi)).  The first order condition 
for this choice is  Uc = UG.  Given a solicitation vector  Z  and a set of taxes  {τi}, each 
individual's choice of giving can be written as a deterministic function  gi(yi, τi, τ–i, Z).  It can be 
shown as in the text for the basic model in section 2 that ʴgi/ʴτi = –1  and  ʴgi/ʴτj = 0  for  i ≠ j.  
These partial derivatives, though, are conditional on a fixed solicitation vector  Z.  In 
equilibrium, when the government's choice of taxes changes, the charity's choice of fundraising 
will change and thus so will  Z.   
  The charity takes as given each individual's response to the tax levels and the solicitation 








i i i i Z y g Z ) ) , , , ( ( ) ; Pr(
1
   . 
The charity sets  θ  so that its marginal cost of increasing  θ,  F'(θ),  is equal to the marginal 
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A charity cannot directly choose who it solicits for donations, it can only choose the probability 
that any individual is solicited.  As it alters this probability, the probability of different draws of 
the solicitation vector is accordingly changed.  To somewhat simplify the charity's first order 
condition, assume that individuals are homogeneous.  Now, instead of dealing with a solicitation 
vector  Z,  the outcome of the random draw can be described with the number of individuals 











 ) 1 ( ) ; Pr(    .  Furthermore, use symmetry to reduce each individual's   gi(yi, τi, τ–i, 
Z)  to merely  g(τ,z),  where this is defined as the amount that each individual who solicits 
chooses to contribute (g = 0  for those who are not solicited).   
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The derivative of the binomial probability expression with respect to  θ  is positive for values of  
z  in the sum that are greater than  θN,  the expected value of  z,  and is negative for values lower.  
An higher  θ  makes it more likely that a higher value of  z  will be drawn and makes it less likely 
that a lower value of  z  will be drawn.   
  The right hand side of the first order condition above can be written in the form of an 
expectation over the binomial distribution.  After simplifying, this becomes 
)] , ( ) (
) 1 (
1
[ ) ( ' z g z N z E F  
 
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
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In general, this expectation cannot be evaluated without knowing the form of  g(τ, z),  and in 
particular how it depends on  z.  However, temporarily assume that  g  is independent of  z.  That 
is, the amount donated by an individual who is solicited is independent of the number of 
individuals solicited.  For the charity, this means that the benefit of increasing  θ  lies only in its 
increasing the probability of soliciting a higher number of donors  z,  but not in changing the 
amount that each individual who donates will give  g.  This assumption is strong and unlikely to 
be true, but it is used here to make the charity's first order condition more interpretable.  Under 
this assumption,  g(τ, z)  can be pulled out of the expectation operator.  Thus, 
) , ( )] ( ) ( )[ , (
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The marginal cost of increasing  θ,  F'(θ),  equals the marginal benefit.  This benefit consists only 
in the increased expected number of people donating, the final expression on the right of the 
above equation.   
  The first order condition implicitly gives the charity's choice of  θ  as a function of the 
government's tax choice  τ.  The implicit function theorem can be used to show how  θ  changes 
with  τ.  In general, this expression cannot be signed.  Making the same assumption as earlier that 
the level of an individual's giving  g(τ, z)  is independent of  z,  the derivative can be shown to 
equal 










The denominator of this expression is strictly positive.  The entire expression, then, is of the 
same sign as  ʴg/ʴτ,  the change in an individual's giving in response to a change in the tax level, 
for a fixed  z.  Since this partial derivative is negative, as shown in the main text, the entire 
derivative above is negative.  That is, under the given assumption, an increase in the 
government's tax level leads to a decrease in the charity's fundraising expenditures.  This mimics 
the main finding of the theory in Andreoni and Payne (2003), which is that government grants 
crowd out fundraising expenditures.   
  One can consider then how private donations to the charity are affected by government 
grants taking into account the charity's endogenous response to those grants.  Let total private 
donations  Gp = Σgi.  Then,  

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expected value changes with  τ  depends on how  g  and  θ  change with  τ.  Thus, 
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The final term inside the bracket of the expectation operator represents the "classic" crowd out 
that results from an increase in government funding of the public good; individuals will reduce 
their giving.  The first term arises from the response of the charity.  This endogenous response 
can thus change the magnitude of the crowding out of private donations.   55 
Appendix Table A1 
The Determinants of Private Donations, No IV
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Government Grants  -0.0618***  0.00326  -0.0715***  -0.0654***  -0.0177***  -0.0607*** 
  (0.0159)  (0.0101)  (0.0203)  (0.0201)  (0.00368)  (0.0131) 
Fundraising Expenditures  1.494***  0.438**  1.593***  1.552***  0.617***  1.601*** 
  (0.202)  (0.180)  (0.375)  (0.280)  (0.0634)  (0.188) 
Program Service Revenue  -0.0407***  -0.0188***  -0.0533***  -0.0492***  -0.00248**  -0.0392*** 
  (0.00955)  (0.00634)  (0.0150)  (0.0162)  (0.00104)  (0.00744) 
Other Revenues  -0.0234*  -0.0155  -0.0201  -0.0152  0.00107  -0.0124 
  (0.0133)  (0.0140)  (0.0213)  (0.0203)  (0.00262)  (0.00940) 
Population  0.00518  0.00196  0.00946  0.00562  -7.75e-05  -0.000248 
  (0.00387)  (0.00389)  (0.00686)  (0.00563)  (0.000970)  (0.000491) 
Income  -0.213  -0.284  -0.919  -0.683  0.139  2.043* 
  (0.881)  (0.905)  (1.712)  (1.236)  (0.156)  (1.242) 
Unemployment Rate  -1569  -1390  -1787  -2071  -58.28  -1190 
  (1452)  (1737)  (2119)  (2078)  (428.9)  (2359) 
Percent Population > 65  -1792307***  -1395893**  -3031024***  -2283532***  -447337***  -995929*** 
  (525416)  (602294)  (1.02e+06)  (759465)  (149303)  (313287) 
Number Dem Senators  43.43  -4909  -6060  -160.9  1106  795.0 
  (3700)  (5214)  (5896)  (5446)  (991.4)  (3063) 
Percent Congress members Dem  27393  22378  52106*  18813  6601  15948 
  (18941)  (20563)  (31193)  (27529)  (5092)  (14359) 
Indicator for Democratic governor  -674.9  2526  -5808  2325  -1643  -3246 
  (3964)  (4310)  (5742)  (5616)  (1073)  (3147) 
Constant  492061***  450588***  730831***  617962***  168046***  290625*** 
  (77929)  (85760)  (147615)  (111803)  (20569)  (58179) 
Observations  174828  145690  85770  111474  158390  271436 
Number of Organizations  29138  29138  14306  18579  27561  59020 
Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years (except column 6), whose reported categorical revenues sum 
up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount in a revenue category.   Year indicator variables are included in 
each regression.   Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  Column definitions are the same as in Table 2. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A2 
The Determinants of Government Grants, No IV
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Private Donations  -0.0664***  0.00184  -0.110***  -0.0642***  -0.0343***  -0.0582*** 
  (0.0182)  (0.0103)  (0.0328)  (0.0208)  (0.00830)  (0.0137) 
Program Service Revenue  -0.265***  -0.277***  -0.464***  -0.257***  -0.0425***  -0.247*** 
  (0.0321)  (0.0418)  (0.0283)  (0.0528)  (0.00742)  (0.0241) 
Other Revenues  -0.0180  -0.0245  -0.0127  -0.00309  -0.00170  -0.00226 
  (0.0123)  (0.0149)  (0.0248)  (0.0154)  (0.00482)  (0.00907) 
Population  0.00484  -0.00132  0.00988  0.00751  9.90e-05  0.00218*** 
  (0.00374)  (0.00326)  (0.00750)  (0.00459)  (0.00184)  (0.000793) 
Income  -1.137  -1.334*  -2.306  -1.020  -0.417*  -4.917** 
  (0.839)  (0.754)  (1.783)  (1.162)  (0.218)  (1.936) 
Unemployment Rate  -2336  -2582  -4166  -5048*  -1193  -11713*** 
  (2137)  (2126)  (3675)  (2929)  (869.2)  (2965) 
Percent Population > 65  -917095  -435464  -3628034  462123  -454900*  -615543 
  (983391)  (875084)  (2.62e+06)  (1.21e+06)  (253520)  (426132) 
Number Dem Senators  4387  9658  1490  2808  -1618  4427 
  (4855)  (6126)  (8984)  (6783)  (1613)  (3755) 
Percent Congress members Dem  42882  64678**  143450***  66103*  12167  17649 
  (26765)  (29477)  (49382)  (37025)  (8552)  (19079) 
Indicator for Dem governor  13237***  19397***  27128***  19913***  2024  12529*** 
  (4993)  (5051)  (8993)  (6711)  (1758)  (3892) 
Constant  701506***  643952***  1.41e+06***  495545***  273145***  698577*** 
  (135541)  (129385)  (344128)  (169543)  (35461)  (75814) 
Observations  174828  145690  85770  111474  158390  271436 
Number of Organizations  29138  29138  14306  18579  27561  59020 
a Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years (except column 6), whose reported categorical revenues sum 
up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount in a revenue category.  Year indicator variables are included in each 
regression.   Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  Column definitions are the same as in Table 3. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A3 
First Stage Regressions, Dependent Variable = Government Grants
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
SSI payments, total  0.0234**  0.0210**  0.0356*  0.0243*  -0.00210  0.0234*** 
  (0.0106)  (0.0105)  (0.0191)  (0.0144)  (0.00377)  (0.00886) 
SSI payments, elderly  -0.121***  -0.114**  -0.216***  -0.133**  -0.00972  -0.110*** 
  (0.0438)  (0.0445)  (0.0805)  (0.0605)  (0.0150)  (0.0365) 
Management Expenses  0.450***  0.251***  0.691***  0.470***  0.0670***  0.430*** 
  (0.0850)  (0.0591)  (0.244)  (0.133)  (0.0179)  (0.0695) 
Total Liabilities  0.0144*** 0.0128***  0.0508***  0.0151** 0.00241*** 0.0129*** 
  (0.00354)  (0.00326)  (0.0166)  (0.00595)  (0.000732)  (0.00245) 
Program Service Revenue  -0.294*** -0.105***  -0.496***  -0.281*** -0.0487***  -0.276*** 
  (0.0355)  (0.0204)  (0.0290)  (0.0571)  (0.00889)  (0.0266) 
Other Revenues  -0.0262**  -0.00553  -0.0376  -0.0209  -0.00408  -0.00745 
  (0.0131)  (0.00933)  (0.0252)  (0.0165)  (0.00494)  (0.00978) 
Population  0.00507  0.00175  0.00603  0.00738  0.000351  0.00214*** 
  (0.00391)  (0.00304)  (0.00663)  (0.00456)  (0.00183)  (0.000790) 
Income  -1.215  -0.152  -2.290  -1.077  -0.435**  -5.162*** 
  (0.792)  (0.923)  (1.588)  (1.083)  (0.219)  (1.919) 
Unemployment Rate  -2801  1114  -5230  -5748**  -1240  -11589*** 
  (2078)  (2254)  (3512)  (2841)  (867.6)  (2923) 
Percent Population > 65  -646183  525829  -1986579  844927  -449688*  -445784 
  (977083)  (1.38e+06)  (2.55e+06)  (1.21e+06)  (254037)  (424516) 
Number Dem Senators  4774  15265**  5212  3267  -1608  4297 
  (4761)  (7650)  (8758)  (6665)  (1606)  (3691) 
Percent Congress 
members Dem 
46399*  -12623  119137**  65057*  13512  19700 
  (26218)  (28963)  (47847)  (36443)  (8513)  (18693) 
Indicator for Dem 
governor 
13640***  8380  28872***  19271***  2217  12809*** 
  (4881)  (6113)  (8590)  (6580)  (1757)  (3815) 
Constant  585937***  317600*  1.05e+06*** 369730** 261776*** 619439*** 
  (133602)  (179197)  (337105)  (167043)  (35512)  (74692) 
Observations  174828  145690  85770  111474  158390  271436 
Number of Organizations  29138  29138  14306  18579  27561  59020 
a Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years (except column 
6), whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never 
report a negative amount in a revenue category. Year indicator variables are included in each regression.   
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  Column definitions are the same as in Table 2. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A4 
First Stage Regressions, Dependent Variable = Fundraising Expenditures
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
SSI payments, total  0.00127  0.00123*  0.00100  0.00218**  0.000540  0.000940 
  (0.000795)  (0.000722)  (0.00112)  (0.00107)  (0.000416)  (0.000664) 
SSI payments, 
elderly 
-0.00621*  -0.00607*  -0.00663  -0.0110**  -0.00252  -0.00470 
  (0.00362)  (0.00329)  (0.00472)  (0.00461)  (0.00168)  (0.00297) 
Management 
Expenses 
0.00587***  0.00445**  0.00865**  0.00569**  0.00128  0.00700*** 
  (0.00207)  (0.00203)  (0.00384)  (0.00275)  (0.000886)  (0.00201) 
Total Liabilities  0.000377*** 0.000405*** 0.000853** 0.000417** 0.000140** 0.000232*** 
  (0.000120)  (0.000123)  (0.000407) (0.000212)  (6.89e-05)  (7.81e-05) 
Program Service 
Revenue 
0.00144**  0.00149*  0.000762  0.00129  0.00190***  0.00143** 
  (0.000698)  (0.000784)  (0.00100)  (0.000874) (0.000465)  (0.000588) 
Other Revenues  -0.000840  -0.00295**  -0.000101  0.00234    -1.75e-05 
  (0.00164)  (0.00139)  (0.00321)  (0.00178)    (0.000907) 
Population  0.000279  0.000712**  0.000500  0.000334  8.15e-05  3.08e-05 
  (0.000302)  (0.000340)  (0.000416) (0.000389) (0.000147)  (0.000127) 
Income  -0.0688  -0.141*  -0.167  -0.0381  -0.0181  0.0458 
  (0.0827)  (0.0739)  (0.126)  (0.106)  (0.0288)  (0.171) 
Unemployment Rate  746.2***  558.4***  997.6***  1020***  360.2***  -54.08 
  (199.9)  (198.4)  (290.2)  (261.1)  (86.75)  (324.2) 
Percent Population > 
65 







  (70558)  (70507)  (137262)  (101258)  (35995)  (42336) 
Number Dem 
Senators 
365.5  1017  403.2  168.2  -259.3  364.1 
  (467.6)  (869.8)  (590.5)  (565.4)  (217.8)  (382.4) 
Percent Congress 
members Dem 
251.8  -352.2  -597.2  -327.4  -225.1  -937.5 
  (2743)  (2621)  (3421)  (3157)  (1328)  (2103) 
Indicator for Dem 
governor 
353.6  -271.2  462.9  467.0  -134.3  308.0 
  (596.2)  (410.5)  (949.7)  (839.7)  (238.6)  (460.3) 
Constant  47610***  38233***  63404***  55400***  23117***  27074*** 
  (9319)  (9352)  (17074)  (13395)  (4920)  (9036) 
Observations  174828  145690  85770  111474  158390  271436 
Number of ein  29138  29138  14306  18579  27561  59020 
a Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years (except column 
6), whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never 
report a negative amount in a revenue category. Year indicator variables are included in each regression.   
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  Column definitions are the same as in Table 2. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A5 
First Stage Regressions, Dependent Variable = Private Donations
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dues  -0.104*  -0.0963*  -0.101  -0.122  -0.0276***  0.211 
  (0.0615)  (0.0564)  (0.0934)  (0.0745)  (0.0101)  (0.176) 
Program Service 
Revenue 
-0.0216***  -0.00109  -0.0184**  -0.0300**  -0.000473  0.347** 
  (0.00671)  (0.00390)  (0.00898)  (0.0121)  (0.000965)  (0.169) 
Other Revenues  -0.0234*  0.00394  -0.0189  -0.0109  0.00359  0.0791 
  (0.0138)  (0.0163)  (0.0228)  (0.0210)  (0.00259)  (0.118) 
Population  0.00506  0.00102  0.00932  0.00525  -0.000103  0.00611 
  (0.00391)  (0.00392)  (0.00678)  (0.00567)  (0.000984) (0.00479) 
Income  -0.336  0.175  -1.147  -0.797  0.103  -3.943 
  (0.900)  (0.855)  (1.733)  (1.264)  (0.157)  (5.477) 
Unemployment Rate  169.4  3986**  630.9  391.6  310.2  -8315 
  (1501)  (1699)  (2182)  (2123)  (438.7)  (6716) 













  (534664)  (663197)  (1.06e+06)  (766403)  (150673)  (4.66e+06) 
Number Dem 
Senators 
-415.4  -9551  -6184  -703.4  807.3  2269 
  (3772)  (6037)  (6060)  (5557)  (1010)  (10903) 
Percent Congress 
members Dem 
18011  52334**  33689  5246  4128  -19560 
  (19632)  (21413)  (31949)  (28036)  (5141)  (51476) 
Indicator for Dem 
governor 
-4704  1491  -10825*  -2480  -2739**  -10614 
  (4104)  (4566)  (5705)  (5830)  (1101)  (10470) 
Constant  508749***  494835***  715667***  659231*** 172993***  -185785 
  (78631)  (94731)  (151091)  (113007)  (20719)  (543422) 
Observations  174828  145690  85770  111474  158390  391591 
Number of 
Organizations 
29138  29138  14306  18579  27561  89813 
a Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years (except column 
6), whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never 
report a negative amount in a revenue category. Year indicator variables are included in each regression.   
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  Column definitions are the same as in Table 3. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 